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The question "who may wage war?" featured prominently in early
writings regarding the justifiability of recourse to force in pursuit of
external political objectives. The scholarly interest in this question,
however, declined markedly following the emergence of the modem
state system. The concentration of national decision-making authority
in the hands of the sovereign had rendered the issue far less relevant by
substituting a monopolistic power structure for a fragmented one. The
direction of change, though, has not shifted exclusively from the decen-
tralized to the centralized end of the political spectrum. Post World
War II national decision-makers enjoyed a narrower latitude with re-
spect to the use of military might than that enjoyed by state officials in
the preceding phases of the modern state era. The question of who may
wage war has not necessarily regained its early significance, but it is
perceived as more relevant than at any time since the advent of central-
ized state politics. This article explores the partial resurrection of this
question.
A general presumption against the use of force has always existed,
even in the nineteenth century when states indulged in war as a matter
of sovereign right. At the same time, theorists and practitioners alike
generally realized that violence was part of human life and could not
be wholly suppressed or denied. The formulation of a doctrine resulted
that dealt with the problem of force in international relations not
through a total ban, but via a system of limitations and restraints, on
both ends and means. Consequently, the legitimacy and justness of war
depended on meeting specific conditions, namely if undertaken by the
lawful authority, with the intention of promoting good and removing
evil, for causes deemed just, and if the means employed were propor-
tional to the ends of war.
* This article is based on material from a doctoral dissertation completed under the
supervision of Professor H. Booysen of the Department of Constitutional and Public
International Law at UNISA. The author is indebted to Professor Booyson for his
encouragement, patience, and constructive comments but assumes sole responsibility
for the final product.
* Lecturer in Law, University of Hong Kong.
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A series of sub-conditions qualified these broadly-stated conditions,
articulating a more systematic and coherent scheme with changing de-
grees of emphasis laid on the various conditions at different periods of
time. The present article, however, examines only conditions related to
the question "who may wage war?". This question refers primarily to
the authority responsible for the decision to wage war. Because wars
are seldom confined to two parties directly confronting one another, but
affect third parties in various ways, it is also necessary to consider here
the issues of neutrality and collective self-defense. Both principles con-
fer rights and impose obligations on potential actors in the context of
international conflicts and thus either circumscribe or broaden the defi-
nition of the "legitimate authority."
II. ANALYTICAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY
A. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
To qualify as "just," war must be waged by the legitimate public
authority or auctoritas principas. Historically, this principle pertained
primarily to offensive wars since these professedly served as an instru-
ment of justice and were, therefore, an exercise of "divinely" author-
ized judicial and executive power. In antiquity, given the assumption of
an unlimited and omnipotent state, the supreme authority of the state
possessed the exclusive power to wage wars.1 Such a posture continued
during the third and fourth centuries, at a time when Christianity was
linked with the secular power of the Emperor. St. Augustine contended
that the natural order most favorable to peace among men demanded
that the decision and power to declare war was the preserve of the
sovereign; if he decided that war was necessary, he had the right to
initiate hostilities, and the soldiers and citizens under his command
1. Plato's writings demonstrate the view that the waging of war could not be a
prerogative of any subordinate power in the state, nor of a section thereof or an individ-
ual, because no one has the right to imperil the good of the state (as is common in war)
except the juridical guardian of the common good. Indeed, the penalty of death
awaited "any person" and "any section of the state" making peace or war with any
parties independently of the commonwealth. PLATO, THE LAWS 507, bk. XII (J. Saun-
ders trans. 1970); see also Aristotle, Politics 179, bk. IV, ch. XIV, in THE BAsIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (R. McKeon ed. 1941) (discussing the Kurion's (supreme body)
responsibility for making war). Ancient Roman doctrine vested the ultimate political
decision to wage war in the Senate (see Cicero, DE LEGIBUS, bk. III, ch. III, at para. 8
(J. Vahlen trans. 1883)) subject, however, to a certification by the College Fetiale as to
the existence of a just cause of war. Id. bk. II, ch. IX, at para. 21. This was in con-
formity with the Roman belief that political power, considered abstractly, flowed from
the gods and that human agents could properly exert political authority when that
authority was divinely sanctioned.
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were obligated to obey his orders whether or not they agreed with his
judgment.2 In the Middle Ages, the church imposed limits on the
sphere of state influence. As a result, the power to wage a lawful war
shifted into the hands of the papacy. 3 Be it the Roman Church or the
sovereign Prince, medieval legists, occupied as they were with the polit-
ical-ecclesiastical organization, paid particular attention to the require-
ment that a just war be waged by the legitimate authority.' This em-
phasis contrasted with that of earlier churchmen, who had concerned
themselves with the underlying moral question of whether or not a spe-
cific war had a just cause.
The original significance of the auctoritas principas criterion was
closely connected with the legal distinction between public and private
wars and was designed to exclude the latter from the domain of the
bellum justum doctrine; private feuds and revolutions were to be pro-
scribed. Hence, if a prince did not lawfully have the right to order a
war for a public purpose, he could have no right to levy a just war.
Such a requirement, however, grew steadily less important as the
Church's hold on individual rulers weakened, and became more of a
formality when, in the fifteenth century and onwards, it coincided with
the emergence of the patrimonial state and the idea of absolute sover-
eignty. The notion of sovereignty as the crucial factor in the application
2. St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum (trans. of 398 text by Stothert), in
WORKS OF AURELIUS AUGUSTINE 450, ch. XXII, para. 75 (M. Dods ed. 1878); see
also H. DEANE, THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF ST. AUGUSTINE 14849 (1963).
3. See J. Lignano, De Bello. De Represalis et De Duello, in CLASSICS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 231-32 (J. Brierly ed. 1917). Other views were, however, common (e.g.,
power-sharing between independent secular monarchies, with each ruler having the au-
thority to defend his own patria and punish those who resisted his jurisdiction or in-
vaded his rights and territories; power-sharing amongst all feudal lords). See F. RUS-
SELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 299 (1975). Some form of indirect power-
sharing between the Prince and the Church was also advocated. See T. AQUINAS, 'ON
WAR,' SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II-II, Quaest 40, art. 2, obj. 3 and ad. 3 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans. 1919) (a balance between regnum and sacerdotium,
acknowledging the indirect authority exercised by the Church through "inducement,"
"disposal," and "counselling" of secular princes to wage war); F. VIcToRIA, 'ON THE
LAW OF WAR,' DE INDIS ET DE lURE BELLI 158, 173, para. 21 (1917) (Church authori-
ties to be consulted by the Prince in the ascertainment of justness of a cause); Victoria,
'On the Indians,' id. at 158, sec. III, para. 14 (control by the Church in cases which
involved Christians or possible damage to the Church); B. AYALA, DE lURE ET OFFICnIS
BELLICIS Er DISCIPLINA MILITARI LIBRI III 19, 27, ch. II (1912) (Pope's modes of
restraint over kings who abuse their position); Suarex, Defenso Fidel Arersus Angli-
canae Sctae Errorers, cited in Nussbaum, Just War-A Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 453, 463 (1943) (discussing the Pope's authority to release subjects from duty of
obedience to an "incorrigibly wicked," "schismatic" or "stubborn heretic" king).
4. See W. BALLIS, THE LEGAL POSITION OF WAR: CHANGES IN ITS PRACTICE AND
THEORY FROM PLATO TO VATTEL 49-58 (1977) (classifying wars as just or unjust ac-
cording to authority and organization).
1987]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
of the just war doctrine (or, specifically, the laws of war) had nonethe-
less survived the changes, and private warfare continued to be ex-
cluded. Indeed, classic writings of international law invariably empha-
sized that only full sovereign states possessed the required legal
qualifications entitling them to belligerent status and the attendant
rights and duties in war. 5 In practice, however, the fact that a given
entity was not a fully sovereign state did not prevent it necessarily from
becoming a belligerent, if it possessed military forces and resources and
evinced a desire to go to war.6 The rules of international law applied in
such circumstances, even in the absence of the required legal qualifica-
tions.7 By a similar reasoning (distinguishing between legal qualifica-
tions and the actual power to wage war), insurgents could become a
belligerent power through recognition. Once an insurgent group was
recognized as a belligerent entity by other states, in response to the
existence of certain factual elements,8 the insurgents enjoyed a tempo-
rary, limited status of belligerency.9
At the same time, the condition of legitimate authority also assumed
a constitutional dimension in that the domestic legal framework deter-
mined the identity of the sovereign within the state. Thus, according to
Wolff:
[i]n a monarchy and in an aristocracy the right of war depends altogether on the
decision of the rulers of the state, but in mixed states the same can depend either
on the decision of the ruler of the state, or on the will of the people or of the
nobles, or for beginning or ending a war the ruler of the state is bound at least to
seek the consent either of the people or of the nobles. But in a democracy or a
popular state since the sovereignty rests with the entire people, the right of war
also rests with the people."0
5. See 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 59-71 (1906) (discussing
recognition of belligerency throughout the nineteenth century).
6. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (1952) (stating that although
semi-sovereign states are not legally qualified to become belligerent, possession of
armed forces makes it possible to enter a war and become belligerent). An example of
such belligerency occurred in 1876 when Serbia and Montenegro, vassal states under
Turkish suzerainty, declared war on Turkey. Id. at 248-49; see also T. BATY, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 67-68 (1900) (recognizing the possibility of war be-
tween suzerain and vassal).
7. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 (1952).
8. Id. at 249-50. Certain conditions create a right and a duty of other states to
recognize belligerency, including: (1) the existence of a state of general hostilities; (2)
an orderly occupation by the insurgents of a substantial part of the national territory;
(3) the insurgents' observance of the rules of war; and (4) a practical necessity for
other states to clarify their attitude toward that particular insurgency. Id. at 249.
9. See W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-32 (1917) (urging that
belligerent communities, having no established independence and therefore no rights,
cannot legally demand recognition).
10. 2 Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated According to a Scientific Method, in
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Furthermore, attributing responsibility for the initiation of war necessi-
tated the identification of the sovereign."' The complexity of modem
state organization, however, rendered it rather difficult to identify par-
ticular individuals as the authors of war. 2 Indeed, post-World War I
instruments outlawing war such as the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions13 and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact 14 did not include crim-
inal sanctions applicable to persons who might be deemed responsible
for acts of waging war.'5
Yet, the criterion of legitimate authority presupposes the rest of the
just war criteria since it determines who is primarily responsible for
judging whether the other criteria are met. Thus, a decision by the
legitimate authority that war is justified creates in turn a presupposi-
tion for the subjects and soldiers that the authority, being legitimate,
has followed the proper procedures and has decided correctly, hence
obligating them to fight.
B. OTHER PARTICIPANTS
1. Neutral States
Generally, approaches to the question of third parties' decisions to
remain neutral, to intervene, or to support a particular party, have cor-
responded to the varying positions on war throughout history. For in-
stance, while neutrality had manifested itself to some extent in the
politics of ancient Greece, it was by necessity antagonistic to Rome's
imperialist policy. Traditional just war concepts naturally forced a dis-
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 314 (J. Scott ed. 1934); see E. VArraE, THE LAW
oF NATIONS 292 (1863) (noting that only sovereign power has authority to make war);
H. WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (1936) (stating the right to
make war belongs to supreme power of state).
11. See E. VATrEL, supra note 10, at 302 (asserting that the sovereign who wages
unjust war is responsible for its consequences).
12. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on En-
forcement of Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920) (discussing the liability of those
responsible for initiating war in an historical context).
13. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1919).
14. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Foreign Pol-
icy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94
L.N.T.S. 57.
15. See Williams, Sanctions Under the Covenant, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 131-
33 (1936). The League of Nations Covenant imposes no criminal punishment on a
member of the League who engages in war in disregard of its covenants. Id. at 132.
The purpose of article 16 of the Covenant, deemed the "sanctions" article, is to act as a
deterrent for member states contemplating war. Id. Article 16 imposes various eco-
nomic measures, such as the severance and prohibition of all commercial or financial
intercourse, against a member state that resorts to war in disregard of the provisions of
the Covenant. Id. at 131 n.1.
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criminatory stand on third parties, whereas a condition of abstention
from hostilities (whether these were deemed justly or unjustly under-
taken) became recognized, with the passing of the Middle Ages, as a
possible posture for other states to adopt. The latter response is com-
monly explained in the light of the newly-assumed independence of
states and their acquired right of non-interference from their neigh-
bors.16 By the seventeenth century, states regularly practiced neutrality
and it gradually became clear that if war raged between two states,
neutral states had peculiar rights against, and owed peculiar duties to,
the states at war with one another.17 Despite this, no well-defined duty
of third states to go to war became established in that period. Grotius
implied, however, that third states had a duty to help a state that was
waging a just war by pointing out that:
[i]t is the duty of those who keep out of war to do nothing whereby he who
supports a wicked cause may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the move-
ments of him who wages a just war may be hampered. . . . In a doubtful mat-
ter, however, those at peace should show themselves impartial to either side in
permitting transit, in furnishing supplies to troops, and in not assisting those
under siege."
Eighteenth century writers, such as Wolff and Vattel, while recognizing
the ultimate discretion of third parties as to whether to intervene or not
(a decision determined primarily by prudence and expedience), appear
at the same time to acknowledge an obligation on the part of third
parties to aid a state waging a just war and refrain from helping its
opponent. 9 The law of neutrality in the nineteenth century, however,
founded on the absolute right of states to resort to war, reflected the
basic premise of flexibility of alignment; it permitted and encouraged
non-participation as a function of balancing of power.
A change in attitude arose in the early twentieth century in view of
the prevalent policy of punishing law-breakers proportionally, accord-
ing to their guilt. Consequently, the neutral's valuation of the merits of
16. See G. BUTLER & S. MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
231 (1928) (stating that until the nineteenth century no theory supported states de-
manding to remain neutral).
17. W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 43 (1924).
18. 2 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
786 (J. Scott ed. 1925).
19. Compare E. VATTEL, supra note 10, at 324 (articulating a duty to aid in a just
war if it causes no harm to the assisting state) and Wolff, supra note 10, at 337 (sug-
gesting that states who can contribute their aid are bound to assist) with Wolff, supra
note 10, at 347 (stating that if contrary to its best interest, a state is not bound by
nature to give assistance) and 2 Bynkershoek, Questions of Public Law, in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (T. Frank trans. 1930) (suggesting that both custom and rea-
son prescribe state assistance to belligerents).
[VOL. 2:97
WHO MAY WAGE WAR
the conflict or the justice of the cause influenced the relationship of
non-participants to a belligerent.
The League of Nations was founded on this principle. Affected par-
ticularly by World War I's destructive influence on neutrality, the the-
ory which subsequently emerged assumed that the interests of human-
ity and civilization demanded that no state declare itself neutral and
disinterested. War was considered a crime and the state who started it
was the criminal. No member of the world society was justified in de-
nying concern when a crime was committed next door. Such things
could only happen in lawless society; in the civilized world of the twen-
tieth century neutrality and disinterest would no longer be tolerated.
Consequently, every state had the obligation of exercising police power
over nations that were found guilty of aggression, or nations that tried
to improve their position by attacking their neighbors.20
The Kellogg-Briand Pact embodies a similar concept, based on the
right of collective defense and the notion of war as a sanction, by treat-
ing a state's violation of its obligations as a violation of the rights of all
other contracting parties. This permits the latter to take any measures
they considered appropriate, to the exclusion of the duties of neutrality.
Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Kellogg-Briand
Pact abolished neutrality" or in any way brought about the expected
evolution in international relations. In fact, given the absence of an ob-
ligation to the contrary and the lack of objective authority to determine
the illegality of war, states could still invoke the strict impartiality con-
cept of neutrality at their expedience.
2. States Acting Collectively in Self-Defense
Notwithstanding the existence of a duty of participation or the privi-
lege of abstention, third parties could become involved in a war waged
by other states through alliances, or by an extended form of defense
that embraced a war fought against unjust attackers. Indeed, in ancient
20. N. ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY 1914-1941 120 (2d ed. 1971).
21. There existed, nonetheless, a considerable divergence of opinion among authors
of that period as to the influence of both the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact on
neutrality. See, e.g., Warren, Troubles of a Neutral, 12 FOREIGN Arr. 377, 377 (1934)
(stating the impossibility of remaining neutral when either document is violated);
Spitzer, Small Nations and the Economic and Social Council, 109 WORLD Air. 133,
133 (noting the Covenant regarded war as a legitimate instrument of national policy
while the Pact renounced the right to make war but failed to define or provide means to
prevent violations); see also Moore, An Appeal to Reason, 11 FOREIGN AFF. 547, 550
(1933) (discussing the purported sanctions in the Covenant against a state that com-
mits an "act of war").
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Greece, the custom of establishing confederations and alliances22 lim-
ited strict observance of neutrality, imposing upon the members an ob-
ligation to help a fellow member waging war against an outside power.
Later years bore evidence to the proposition that self-defense, invari-
ably regarded as a just cause, also encompassed the "assistance to
neighbors in their defense;' 23 the "defense of friends and allies;' 24 "as-
sistance to nations against unjust oppressors; ' 26 and action to maintain
the "balance of power. "26 Literature of the early twentieth century in
particular reflected the common perception that self-defense, when le-
gitimate, was not necessarily restricted to one's own defense but could
extend to the defense of states unjustly attacked. Additionally, state
practice during the life of the League of Nations, and in subsequent
years, provides numerous illustrations of mutual assistance pacts con-
cluded among nations to defend members against the unlawful use of
force.
Nonetheless, while collective action as a means of enforcing legal or
political standards of international conduct was traditionally recog-
nized, the concept of "collective self-defense," as tied to the strict re-
quirements of the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense, did not
exist in classical international law.
III. CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THE CRITERION
A. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
Insofar as large-scale, conventional war is concerned, the issue of
competent authority bears less relevance in modern times than it did in
the thirteenth century. Given the decentralization of the medieval polit-
ical system-in which overlapping public, private, and criminal vio-
lence resulted in a variety of private wars-it was expected that only
wars declared by order of public authorities, for public purposes, should
be regarded as "just." In today's world, with the concentration of the
material capacity to wage large-scale, modern, conventional war in the
22. W. BALLIS, supra note 4, at 15 (giving examples of alliances and confedera-
tions, including the Athenian leagues, the Peloponnesian confederacy under the leader-
ship of Sparta, the Achaen league, and the Aetelian league).
23. T. AQUINAS, supra note 3, at qu. 188, art. 3, para. 110.
24. B. AYALA, supra note 3, at 10.
25. A. GENTILI, ON THE LAW OF WAR, bk. I, 68-69 (1933). "We are bound by a
natural law . . . to aid one another . . . . [T]he defence of one's own people and of
strangers is equally necessary." Id.
26. von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law,
33 AM. J. INT'L L. 665, 667 (1939); E. VATTEL, supra note 10, at 312 (discussing the
propriety of waging war to maintain the "equilibrium of power").
27. T. BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1930).
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hands of national policy-makers, private wars have ceased to pose a
serious problem.
In a sense, however, the "legitimate authority" condition, which his-
torically limited the military activities of lesser feudal lords and justi-
fied violence only when it could be claimed to be politically necessary,
presently has an analogous function, even in respect to the major pow-
ers. In choosing war or peace, the government of any state arguably
acts as a surrogate for a higher international authority and, as such,
the international (public) quality of its purposes ought to constrain its
decisions. At the same time, what constitutes an internationally accept-
able purpose, as pursued by internationally recognized competent au-
thorities, is not clearly defined under modern international law. Organi-
zations and individuals who do not have the authority and capacity to
wage war in the conventional sense frequently claim rights of insur-
gency, yet wage revolutionary war, often on an international scale. A
discussion of the contemporary application of the "legitimate author-
ity" prerequisite must address the question of whether one can draw a
distinction amongst parties waging war. As suggested by Potter, dis-
tinctions exist between the "violence of bandits and looters, who serve
only their own interest," and would-be patriots organized in guerrilla
bands in the service of a provisional government or a government in
exile, intent on establishing or re-establishing a political constitution
and a new commonwealth.28
Indeed, the traditional statement of the principle that war must be
conducted by a legitimate authority left the question of the relationship
between power and authority largely unexplained: the ruler was the le-
gitimate authority simply because he was a ruler.2 It is possible to
assert, however, as O'Connor does, that in democratic theory, for in-
stance, authority is never simply a given quality; it must be supported
by various forms of power, depending on such diverse elements as polit-
ical force, charisma, and consensus. 30 Arguably the ultimate locus of
authority in a democracy resides with the people, hence, wars not sup-
ported by a fair spectrum of the population are not conducted under
proper authority.31 Attention must thus focus on another contemporary
28. Potter, The Moral Logic of War, in PEACE AND WAR 7, 13 (C. Beitz & T.
Herman eds. 1973).
29. See generally J. Stamey, Christian Ethics and Violent Conflict: The "Just
War" as an Ethical Model 393 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation available at
Boston University library).
30. O'Connor, A Reappraisal of the Just War Tradition, 84 Emics 167, 170
(1974).
31. Id. at 171.
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problem raised with respect to the "legitimate authority" criterion:
namely, whether a particular official or organ of state has the constitu-
tional competence to initiate war, or whether a war unconstitutionally
waged might be considered "unjust" in that it possibly violated the
condition of legitimate authority. The ultimate question of legitimate
authority cannot be resolved by resorting to external criteria alone (for
instance, Israel and South Africa do not enjoy universal recognition,
yet could possibly wage just wars). It is necessary, therefore, to find
some internal, and generally acceptable, criteria of what constitutes a
"legitimate authority." Obviously, the question cannot be decided, for
example, solely on the basis of whether a government is democratically
elected, for most countries are not governed by democratic institutions
in the Western sense of the term. "Power" may be such a criterion, but
in today's unstable world, power is often an elusive factor, and changes
among power holders occur frequently, particularly in the Third World.
Ascertaining who exercises political power also poses difficulties.
Equating power with authority is dangerous, for those in positions of
authority may not be the real power-holders (for instance, China's par-
amount leader, Deng Xiaoping dominates Chinese politics but does not
hold any formal position of power).
Another component of the "legitimate authority" requirement, as
important a safeguard today as it was under the classical tradition,
concerns the responsibility of waging a war. The concept that only a
lawful authority can wage war reinforces the perception that war af-
fecting the entire political community creates a right on behalf of
members of the community to be protected by clear procedures focus-
ing on responsibility for the initiation of war. Failure to observe due
process amounts to a disenfranchisement of the citizens, rendering war
not an act of the political community but an "enterprise of a usurping
minority upon whom guilt must rest."3 2
This point of view is perhaps inspired by idealistic considerations,
which are not necessarily universally shared and which may pose prac-
tical difficulties. Concern with "due process" may conflict with the need
to adhere to norms of efficiency, and democratic outcomes are not al-
ways "just" outcomes. Provided that one accepts the limitations of due
process criteria and is willing to seek compromise between procedurally
correct and efficient government, due process norms may be seen as one
of the many values germane to the issue of legitimate authority. The
difficulty, of course, is that "due process" is not easy to define, and the
international community is not likely to come to an agreement in this
32. Potter, supra note 28, at 13.
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respect. Yet, this should not militate against advocacy of procedural
yardsticks as a general goal in determining who may wage war.
1. Revolutionary Organizations
As indicated earlier, certain developments in the contemporary era
have brought to the fore the issue of identifying the current, interna-
tionally relevant decision-makers. Given the proliferation of authority-
dispensing political entities, such as guerrilla groups, liberation fronts,
provisional governments, and terrorist brigades that operate freely
across state boundaries, the question arises whether modern interna-
tional law recognizes bodies other than sovereign, territorially-bound
states as legitimate authorities who may wage a just war.
It is generally evident that the "state" as such is no longer an organi-
zationally unifying norm. As pointed out by Bozeman, "the integrity of
the classical concept of the state is critically impaired today because it
is being associated indiscriminately with political establishments that
are too different to be comparable and equal in terms of both interna-
tional law and power politics." 3 In addition, the attributes once firmly
ascribed to the state now seem to have been transferred on the one
hand to "government" and on the other to the "world society," neither
of which is definable in uniform, trans-culturally valid ways.
3
4
Concurrently with the erosion of the concept of the "state," demands
to accord to non-state entities locus standi in world affairs have arisen.
In particular, the recognition of revolutionary or liberation movements
as the "properly constituted authority" necessary for the justification of
their wars has legitimized "private international violence."35
The right of self-determination provides the basis for such legal sta-
33. Bozeman, On the Relevance of Hugo Grotius and De Jure Belli Ac Pacis for
Our Times, 1 GROTIANA 65, 73-74 (1980). In a stimulating analysis, Bozeman points
out the varied application of the concept amongst the world's powers. Thus, an unquali-
fied and deliberate inversion of all major values, norms, and institutions together con-
stitutes the Western design of the world society. The Soviet Union represents a "new
model of managing human affairs"; similarly, the Chinese model of a world society is a
unique intellectual and political challenge to that brought forth in the Occident. The
occidental idea of the state received essentially reductive versions in the Middle East,
whereas the modern African state may be indispensable only in the context of the
United Nations and not in Africa proper. Id. at 73-74.
34. Id. at 83.
35. The "international" character may stem from the intensity of the warfare
which threatens to spill over into territories of other states; rebels may be seeking to
overthrow a regime that consistently engages in gross violations of fundamental human
rights norms; or states outside the area of immediate armed conflict threaten to inter-
vene. Often, of course, the international dimension is effected by the actual intervention
of outside states.
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tus claims. Significant in this respect are the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;86 Article I of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;3 7 and the
1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.88 More recent United Nations reso-
lutions bearing on wars of liberation seem to have extended the princi-
ples embodied in the Friendly Relations resolution, although without
the support of the principal Western powers. Most notably, the Decla-
ration on the Grant of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ple,89 recognizes the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples and
peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determina-
tion and independence by all possible means.4 0
These resolutions merely codified a right already recognized in inter-
national law, the right of internal revolution. More controversial,
however, are the provisions dealing with the existence and scope of the
duty of states not to suppress revolutions for self-determination, free-
dom, and independence as well as those dealing with the nature of
other states' participation.4 Indeed, disputes still prevail as to what
constitutes "self-determination," "freedom" and "independence." Such
controversy in this regard arose in the context of the drafting of a defi-
nition of aggression, now embodied in United Nations General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314:18 Unresolved problems remain, however, such as
the legal criteria for identifying the "people," (i.e. the "self" that is
entitled to "determine" itself) and balancing competing self-determina-
tions when these struggles are accompanied by armed hostilities over
long historical periods. These conflicts and cross-purposes surround the
permitted limits of such conflicts.4
36. G.A. Res. 1514, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, 66-67, U.N. Doe. A/
4684 (1960).
37. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966).
38. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121,121-24. U.N. Doc. A/
8082 (1970).
39. G.A. Res. 2908, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 2-3, U.N. Doe. A/L.677
Add.1 (1972).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Sudima, The Right of Revolution: Implication for International Law and Or-
der, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 167-69 (M. MeDougal
& W. Reisman eds. 1981).
42. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J.
INT'L L. 224, 235-37 (1977).
43. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
44. Id. at 232 (discussing the 1973-74 Cyprus affair as an illustration of the imme-
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Nor did the "Consensus Definition" of aggression eliminate the an
biguities and indeterminacies surrounding the question of whether al
gression is only a "state-to-state" relation which has remained a "bitt(
focus of conflicting interpretations . . . as between the main blocs (
states." Specifically, Western states continue to oppose a special dis
pensation to non-state entities to use armed force. Third World state
persist in drawing a distinction between aggressors and their victims
the former referring merely to "states" whereas the latter include non
state entities (peoples). The Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc appeal
content to accept that international aggression is the use of armed force
by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political inde-
pendence of another state, yet support the use of force in wars of na-
tional liberation. There is also the extreme view equating "people" with
,,state., 45
Regardless of whether it is an internationally recognized right, le-
gally enforceable under contemporary international law40 or a mere
"operative principle of the United Nations . . . operating within cer-
tain limits and subjected to the prevailing international climate,"4 self-
determination as a norm of international law endows the "peoples"
with a certain international personality.
Non-state entities have traditionally been accepted in particular cir-
cumstances and for specific purposes as subject to a legal framework
similar to that of states. Situations may occur, for instance, where in-
terests of the governments concerned (e.g., political and commercial in-
terests, protection of nationals, mitigation, or the conduct of hostilities)
favor the granting of belligerent rights to rebels. States (either the law-
ful government or third states) may recognize a state of "insurgency,"
thus indicating that the insurgents are no longer to be identified with
pirates and law-breakers. In effect, such recognition means "acknowl-
edgement of the existence of an armed revolt of grave character and
the lawful government's incapacity, at least temporarily, to maintain
public order and exercise authority over all the parts of the national
territory.
'481
Whether a foreign state may concede to an insurgent body the exer-
diate invocation of aggression).
45. See, e.g., Spain, U.N. Doe. A/AC.6/SR.1472, at 15.
46. Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Development of Humanitarian
Law, in DEcLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 93-117
(1977).
47. Sinha, Has Self-Determination Become a Principle of International Law To-
day?, 14 IND. J. INT'L L. 332, 360 (1974).
48. Castren, Recognition of Insurgency, 5 IND. J. INT'L L. 443, 445-46 (1968)
(presenting general remarks on the recognition of insurgency).
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ise of certain belligerent rights against itself cannot, however, be an-
wered in unequivocal terms.49 Some support exists for the view that
egards the exercise of war rights by insurgents within the territorial
imits of their own country as an unquestionable right. Thus, in 1858
kttorney General Black of the United States declared that "the parties
:o a civil war have the right to conduct it with all the incidents of
lawful war within the territory to which they both belong.""0 Recogni-
tion of insurgency, if forthcoming, can imply the existence of a limited
international personality. Furthermore, under traditional international
law, and when particular conditions are met,51 third states recognize a
civil struggle as a belligerency, thus entitling the factions involved in
that conflict respective customary rights and privileges.
Indeed, the move to enlarge the category of potential beneficiaries of
humanitarian legal regulations is also reflected in conventional interna-
tional law, commencing with the Hague Regulations appended to the
Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.52 Article 4(A) of the Geneva Pris-
oners of War Convention of 1949, 53 which extends Article 2 of the
Regulations, accords a belligerent status to a levee en mass, legally de-
fined as:
It]he inhabitants of a territory not under occupation who, on the approach of the
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having
had the time to organise themselves in accordance with Article I [(i.e., into regu-
lar armed units) provided that] they carry arms openly and if they respect the
laws and customs of war."
Thus, under the international law of war, the rights of waging war and
engaging in armed combat generally devolve on the armed forces of
states with the exception of individuals who, by analogy and conces-
49. See T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 405-06 (1951) (dis-
cussing whether a rebelling civil body can exert authority in order to engage in a
blockade).
50. See 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 329, at 1078 (1906) (dis-
tinguishing the right of rebels to claim rights as a separate power on the high seas from
the unquestioned right to exercise authority within the landed areas they control).
51. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1947). A civil
struggle is recognizable as a belligerency by third-party states when: (1) an armed
conflict of a general character exists; (2) the insurgents occupy and administer a sub-
stantial portion of the national territory; (3) they are internally organized and conduct
hostilities in accordance with the rules of war; and (4) circumstances prevail that make
it necessary for outside states to define their attitude by means of recognition of bellig-
erency. Id.
52. The Hague Convention (No. IV), Oct. 18, 1907, Annex of Regulations, 36
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631.
53. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 Au-
gust 1949, art. 4(A), 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
54. Id. at art. 4(A)(6).
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sion, have been assimilated to such armed forces.
In recent years, however, attempts have intensified to bestow lawful
combatant status on fighters operating for specific political motives
such as "wars of national liberation," "anti-colonial" or "anti-racist,"
and "peoples' wars." In 1968, for instance, a United Nations Confer-
ence on Human Rights held in Teheran passed a resolution according
belligerent rights to persons struggling against "racist or colonial re-
gimes."5 5 Similarly, General Assembly Resolution 3103 on the Basic
Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes 6 proclaimed that:
[t]he armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien
domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts
in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the legal status envisaged to
apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international
instruments are to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colo-
nial and alien domination and racist regimes."7
Article 1(4) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 194958 incorporated a similar provision. National liberation
movements were conferred a priori a belligerent status absent recogni-
tion of, and without reference to, the actual dimensions of the rebellion.
Yet, a large body of opinion considers that:
"[w]hatever the basic argument may be (i.e., the right of self-determination,
self-defense) the factual elements are those which characterize internal conflict.
If a conflict exists, it is precisely because the lawful government intends to exer-
cise sovereignty over the territories in question, a sovereignty which an interna-
tional organization cannot deny to this government. So long as the insurgents
have not succeeded in creating a stable territorial basis, there is no de facto
entity to which international law could attribute all the rights and duties derived
from the laws of war."0
The relevant considerations according to this view are thus "geo-mili-
55. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41], reprinted in 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS
472-74 (1968).
56. G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 142, 142-44. U.N. Doe. A/
9030 (1973).
57. Id.
58. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41, reprinted in 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 472-
74 (1968).
59. Binderscheller-Robert, A Reconsideration of the Law of Armed Conflict, in
THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICTS 52 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 1971); cf.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CON-
FERENCE 52-56 (1971) (analyzing criteria proposed at the Conference of Government
Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts in Geneva from May 24 to June 12, 1971, for charac-
terizing internal struggles to determine whether international rules of war and conduct
apply to the immediate parties and third-party nations).
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tary." The recognition of rebels as a belligerent party is not contingent
on the justice of their cause, but on the magnitude of the rebellion (in
terms of the area subject to the rebels' control, the degree of their or-
ganization, and the extent of the hostilities). As emphasized by Din-
stein, "if the rebels have failed to gain effective control over a signifi-
cant portion of their territory, if they are not led by a responsible
quasi-governmental authority, and if hostilities are limited to episodic
hit-and-run incidents, there is simply no point in pretending that the
laws of interstate warfare can be implemented by them.
'60
In contrast with arguments based on the degree of effective territo-
rial control are the views of the proponents of divergent criteria, or at
least a more flexible interpretation of the "effectiveness" test. "Effec-
tiveness" should not be restrictively defined in terms of formal territo-
rial control, but should include consideration of various factors such as
the control and allegiance of the population, the shifts in territorial
control, and the elements excluded from governmental control.6 1 Fur-
ther, the legal status of a party as a belligerent entity at the interna-
tional level may result from practice and consensus within the frame-
work of international organization. Wars of national liberation, for
instance, have achieved such status on the basis of the self-determina-
tion principle.2 The extent to which international opinion is frag-
mented on the definition of "international armed conflicts" (as set forth
in article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949) is illus-
trated in the debates in the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference on the Re-
affirmation and Development of the International Humanitarian Law.65
Delegations from Western countries presented extensive arguments
against characterizing wars of national liberation as interstate con-
flicts.6 4 Objections included doubt as to a national liberation movement
as an "enduring phenomenon; '6 5 reservations as to the dilution of the
fundamental distinction between "international armed conflicts" and
"conflicts not of an international character"-a distinction which un-
60. Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?, 33 Y.B.
WORLD AFF. 265, 267-68 (1979).
61. See Abi-Saab, supra note 46, at 97.
62. Id. at 143.
63. 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFLICTS, Geneva, CDDH/I/SR.I-6 (1974-77) [hereinafter 8 OFFICIAL REC-
ORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE].
64. See 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 63,
CDDH/I/SR.2, at 11-40 (providing statements from various delegations opposing the
characterization of wars of national liberation as international armed conflicts).
65. See id. at 11 (statement of J. de Breucker, Belgium) (stating wars of liberation
were anachronisms which would soon end).
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derlies the entire system of the Geneva Conventions; 0 and the danger
of endless political debates regarding the characterization of any indi-
vidual war as an "international armed conflict. '67
Most vociferous were the objections grounded in what Abi-Saab calls
"propriety and opportunity from the standpoint of legislative policy."031
The key assertion in this respect was that the fundamental conception
of the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations, and other relevant
instruments was incompatible with a machinery of legal and humanita-
rian protection that varied according to the motives of those engaged in
a particular armed struggle 0 or other political and expedient consider-
ations.70 Generally, it was felt that the classification of armed conflicts
on the basis of non-objective, non-legal criteria was contrary to the
spirit and very essence of humanitarian law.7 1 Similar arguments fo-
cused on the discrimination introduced by conferring an international
character on one particular type of conflict (i.e., wars of national liber-
ation), thus undermining the humanitarian requirement of equal pro-
tection to all concerned.72
Finally, a series of objections to the assimilation of wars of national
liberation to international wars stemmed from feasibility or practicabil-
ity considerations. It was thought that the law of international armed
conflicts was ill-suited to armed conflicts involving non-state parties and
that its application to the latter would result in the circumvention of
66. See id. at 13-14 (statement of G.I.A.D. Draper, United Kingdom) (arguing the
importance of the distinction).
67. See, e.g., id. (statement of G.I.A.D. Draper, United Kingdom) (noting that
terms used in the proposed amendment were too vague to be used as a basis for law-
making); id., CDDH/I/SR.4, at 27 (statement of C. Lysaght, Ireland) (arguing that
terms used in the amendment were too vague to be useful in a legal instrument); id.,
CDDH/I/SR.14, at 106 (statement of M. Balken, West Germany) (stating that the
character of wars of national liberation was often a controversial political issue).
68. See Abi-Saab, supra note 46, at 43 (discussing criticisms of the amendments
based on propriety and opportunity from the standpoint of legislative policy).
69. See, e.g., 80FFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note
63, CDDH/I/SR.2, at 13 (statement of G.I.A.D. Draper, United Kingdom) (arguing
against assimilating wars of national liberation to interstate conflicts); id., CDDH/I/
SR.3, at 19 (statement of J. Caron, Canada) (arguing the protection of victims of
conflicts should not depend upon the motivations of such conflicts).
70. See, e.g., id., CDDH/I/SR.2, at 14 (statement of C. Girard, France) (stating
that humanitarian law must provide protection for all war victims and should not be
subordinated to subjective considerations); id. (statement of G. Prugh, United States)
(stating political concepts should not be allowed to obscure the goal of the Convention);
id. at 20 (statement of E. Rodriguez Roman, Spain) (arguing humanitarian law should
protect all mankind without distinction).
71. Id., CDDH/I/SR.3, at 19 (statement of F. Pictet, Switzerland).
72. See id., CDDH/I/SR.2, at 14 (statement of G. Prugh, United States) (arguing
political concepts should not be allowed to obscure the goal of improving humanitarian
protection to people involved in war).
1987]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the notion of reciprocity between juridically equal entities (states) that
underpins the laws of war.7 3 This argument reflected the perception
that the application of the law of international armed conflict hinges on
the capabilities, the domestic law, and the responsibility of states,
which-together with the threat or use of reprisals in a reciprocal man-
ner-combine to ensure compliance. As a corollary, the lack of re-
sources enjoyed by weaker non-state combatants was seen as a factor
which might lead to non-observance of the law.
Another significant practical constraint highlighted by Western crit-
ics concerned the question of authoritative determination of conflicts in
which people are fighting against their own government. Put simply, no
state is ever going to admit it is a racist regime or exercising alien or
colonial domination.7 4 Yet, no agreement could be reached for the crea-
tion of a new Protecting Power system capable of giving an authorita-
tive judgment as to whether a particular rebellion really constitutes a
war of liberation or a certain movement amounts to a movement for
self-determination. 75 Indeed, doubts were expressed about the possibil-
ity of making an objective determination in all cases, given the vague-
ness of the terms "people ' 78 and "right of self-determination."" In
conjunction with the definition of these concepts, the issue was raised
as to what type of activity undertaken to achieve "self-determination"
constituted an "armed conflict" in the sense of the debated provision,
or what criteria should be employed to determine whether fighting
within a given state has or has not reached the level of an "armed
conflict." The definitions of "alien domination" and "racist regimes" 18
73. See, e.g., id. at I 1 (statement of J. de Breucker, Belgium) (stating the Conven-
tion could not apply to entities which were not states); id., CDDH/I/SR.3, at 22
(statement of A. Cassese, Italy) (arguing the Convention referred to States and not
authorities other than States); id., CDDH/I/SR.5, at 40 (statement of E. Noda, Ja-
pan) (arguing that attempts to apply the Conventions to armed conflicts involving enti-
ties not states would tend to destroy the established system and lead to practical
difficulties).
74. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1977, at 5, col. 5.
75. Forsythe, The Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 69 AM. J. INT'L
L. 77, 89 n.29 (1978).
76. See 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 63,
CDDH/I/SR.2, at 11-12 (statement of J. de Breucker, Belgium) (noting the vagueness
of the term "peoples"); id. at 13 (statement of G.I.A.D. Draper, United Kingdom)
(same).
77. Id. at 25 (statement of G. Prugh, United States); see id., CDDH/I/SR.4, at 26
(statement of C. Lysaght, Ireland) (arguing that the terms "self-determination" and
"armed conflicts" were too vague to be useful).
78. See, e.g., id., CDDH/I/SR.2, at 14 (statement of G. Prugh, United States)
(noting the problems with using undefined concepts); Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic
Conference on the Law of War: A Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the
"Just War" Concept of the Eleventh Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25, 53-54
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were also considered potentially problematic.
The aforementioned objections have been left unanswered to a large
extent.79 Yet, Third World and Socialist countries mounted a forceful
campaign in support of the characterization of wars of national libera-
tion as international armed conflicts. United Nations practice has al-
ready recognized the international character of armed conflicts between
peoples from colonies and other non-self-governing territories, hence in-
ternational humanitarian law ought to reflect the consequences of that
recognition."0 Such recognition could also be implied in the rule that
people fighting for their independence are subjects of general interna-
tional law, whether or not the opposing party recognizes the insur-
gency."' Forcible maintenance of a colonial regime amounts to "perma-
nent aggression," entitling the oppressed people to a right equivalent to
that of self-defense in case of an armed attack.82 Indeed, the proposed
assimilation of wars of national liberation to international armed con-
flicts merely made explicit a rule which has gradually developed and
gained general acceptance over the past quarter of a century.83 The
quantitative weight of these views notwithstanding, the Third World
failed to provide a "value-free," legal rationale for its proposed distinc-
tion between armed conflicts having similar factual properties. As
noted by Forsythe, it was not convincingly clear why the struggle in
(1975) (noting the difficulty in defining these concepts and applying them to situa-
tions); Ribeiro, International Humanitarian Law: Advancing Progress Backwards, 97
S. AFR. L.J. 42, 50-51 (1980) (arguing that the vagueness of these terms would cause
legal chaos).
79. But see 80HncIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 63,
CDDH/I/SR.2, at 3-4 (statement of G. Abi-Saab, Egypt) (countering objections to
the assimilation of wars of national liberation to international conflicts); Abi-Saab,
Wars of National Liberation and the Development of Humanitarian Law, in DECLA-
RATIONS ON PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 143 (1977) (same).
80. See, e.g. 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, supra note
63, CDDH/I/SR.2, at 8 (statement of G. Abi-Saab, Egypt) (arguing humanitarian
law should recognize wars of national liberation as international armed conflict); id. at
8-9 (statement of M. Cristescu, Romania) (arguing that humanitarian law came within
the framework of international law and should conform to its principles); id. at 9
(statement of K. Obradovic, Yugoslavia) (arguing that, in accordance with substantive
international law, any armed struggle waged to achieve self-determination should be
considered an international armed conflict).
81. See id., CDDH/I/SR.5, at 35 (statement of N. Rechetnjak, Ukranian S.S.R.)
(noting that struggling peoples were subjects of international law whether recognized
or not).
82. Id., CDDH/I/SR.2, at 12 (statement of B. Graefrath, East Germany).
83. Id., CDDH/I/SR.2, at 9 (statement of K. Obradovic, Yugoslavia); see also id.
at 12 (statement of B. Graefrath, East Germany) (stating the proposal merely codified
customary international law already in force); id., CDDH/I/SR.3, at 17 (statement of
V. Boulanenkov, U.S.S.R.) (stating sole object of the proposal was to embody in hu-
manitarian law a rule which was already in existence).
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Biafra, for instance, was not as "international" as the struggle in An-
gola." Similarly, Cassese questioned, from the vantage point of hu-
manitarian protection, the attempt to distinguish between individuals
fighting for national liberation movements. 5
Given the lack of objective machinery to determine authoritatively
the application of the 1977 Protocol Relating to the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)," the import, in
practical terms, of article 1(4) therein remains somewhat questionable.
Insofar as states which have accepted the Protocol's provisions are con-
cerned, wars of national liberation may have been "upgraded" to the
level of international conflicts-thus conferring the full status of lawful
combatants on those engaged in them. In view of the persistent objec-
tions from major powers, however, Protocol I cannot be said to codify
customary international law in this respect.88
Purporting, as it does, to grant privileged belligerent status to na-
tional liberation movements per se when they are engaged in wars
against "colonial" and "racist" regimes and "alien" occupying powers,
Protocol I is also morally objectionable. It is true, as argued by For-
sythe, that the yardstick of "justness" is not unknown in municipal law
where "exceptions are frequently carved out of the domestic jurisdic-
tion of states on the basis of 'justice.' "89 The justice applied in the
context of Protocol I, however, is of a rather restrictive nature. Besides
being an "evil in itself," racial classification as a single consideration
for the admission of national liberation movements as entities which
have the lawful competence to engage in international armed conflicts
introduces a discriminatory clause into the law. Why should legitimacy
be conferred on those involved in an armed resistance to a govern-
ment's oppression that is based on race, but not if such resistance is
based, for instance, on ideology?
84. See Forsythe, supra note 75, at 82 (discussing the failure to develop a system
able to distinguish a war of liberation from a mere rebellion).
85. See Ciobanu, The Attitude of the Socialist Countries, in THE NEw HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 399 (A. Cassese ed. 1979) (commenting on views
expressed by delegates from the Soviet bloc that mercenaries are "criminal" and should
be punished as such).
86. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), at annex
I, 1 U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter
Protocol I].
87. Cassese, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, 30 INT'L COMp. L.Q. 416, 417 (1981).
88. Dinstein, supra note 60, at 281 (stating that both Protocols revise and modify
customary international law). Consequently, those states which desire not to be bound
by either Protocol, may regard it as res inter alons acta. Id.
89. Forsythe, supra note 75, at 83.
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The 1977 Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-In-
ternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)90 has taken a more accept-
able approach with respect to "dissident armed forces or other organ-
ized armed groups." Protocol II extends to these rebels certain basic
protections of the laws of war. In conformity with traditional interna-
tional law,"' revolutionary belligerents in this category satisfy the
"competent authority" requirement only when they "under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement [the laws of war]. ' '92 Relying on pragmatic criteria which
are reasonably easy to ascertain-namely, degrees of organization, con-
trol by responsible commanders, and political and military suc-
cess--constitutes a more satisfactory strategy. Reference to the covert
character of modern revolutionary movements often renders it difficult
to judge their claim to qualify as the legitimate authority for oppressed
people. Equally difficult is the task of distinguishing between revolu-
tionaries entitled to legitimate acceptance and ordinary criminals.
Added to these constraints is the tendency of revolutionaries to fol-
low the Leninist model of political leadership with its centralized jus-
tice elite which is empowered to make all the decisions concerning the
just revolutionary cause. The unreliability of factors such as the sup-
port for the revolutionary leadership, often obtained by means of coer-
cion and recognition of foreign powers and is commonly influenced by
subjective political policies, also justifies use of the criteria enumerated
by Protocol II.
In light of the above reservations, and the mainstream developments
in the positive law of belligerency (as reflected in article 1 of Protocol
II), 93 insofar as treating revolutionaries as belligerents in war is
concerned:
the ultimate answer lies in the character, magnitude and degree of success of the
revolutionaries. If they can organize a government that carries on their war in a
controlled fashion (assuming a magnitude requiring counter-measures that more
90. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
annex II, 5 U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [herein-
after Protocol II].
91. Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
annex, sec. I, ch. I, arts. I-III, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 205 Parry's T.S. 277
(listing requirements for belligerent status); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320-23, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, U.N.T.S. 135 (defining "protected persons" entitled to prisoner of war status).
92. Protocol II, supra note 90, at art. 1(1).
93. Id.
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resemble war than ordinary police operations), and if the conflict continues for
an appreciable time, the revolutionaries may have won their right to be consid-
ered a competent authority for purposes of just war.
9 4
A question nonetheless arises as to who has the right to speak for the
revolution, to initiate or terminate the revolution, to determine the
strategies and tactics of revolutionary war. A simple answer, and possi-
bly the most pragmatic one, is that whoever has the power to mount
revolutionary activity on a significant and sustained scale also has the
legitimate authority to compel participation of the people in their fight
for the revolutionary cause. Such an answer, however, overlooks the
distinction between "power" and "authority," leaving unresolved the
fundamental issue of whether the just war criterion of auctoritas
principas requires, besides a formal control of power properly acquired,
legitimacy in the sense of commanding the allegiance of people to the
government in power as being the most appropriate for their society.es
Put another way, should there exist a certain measure of affinity be-
tween the people in general and the institution of the government in
power, so that allegiance naturally results without the use of coercion
before a war can be said to have been waged by the "legitimate
authority"?
2. The Legitimacy Factor
As noted earlier, no clear rule has emerged in international law with
respect to the relationship between power and authority in the context
of the just war criterion of "legitimate authority." As a matter of self-
evident truth, however, "war without the consent of the warrior is
impossible."9
The modern democratic tradition is unequivocal in its insistence on
the principle that the government's authority over the people is never
absolute. This authority must remain subordinate in the final reckon-
ing, both morally and empirically, to the authority that the people have
over the government. Human rights must predominate the government.
94. W. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 19 (1981); see also
Draper, Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR
135, 148-50 (M. Howard ed. 1979) (stating that national liberation movements and
internal armed conflicts must reach a certain level of organization and intensity to fall
within the ambit of the Protocols).
95. See Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 69, 86 (1959) (defining legitimacy as "the
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political
institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society").
96. Somerville, Democracy and the Problem of War, 27 HUMANIST 77, 78 (1967).
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This is the irreducible meaning of the sovereignty of the people.' The
corollary is that as "legal" as a government may be in terms of its title
to power, it cannot exercise its war-making power as a matter of right,
nor can it legitimately compel participation of individuals at war. The
additional element of acquiescence of the people is necessary in order
to comply with the requirements of the "legitimate authority"
criterion.98
As in the case of the "due process" yardstick discussed earlier, there
are of course considerable practical difficulties in applying democratic
principles. Democracy is not the sole value relevant to the waging of
war and there can be values which should, at least in certain circum-
stances, take precedence over it. Democratic practices also do not lend
themselves easily to a definition in operational terms and are subject to
conflicting interpretations. Still, democracy may be valuable as a gen-
eral norm, even if it cannot be translated into specific requirements.
3. The "Constitutional" Aspect
The importance of popular consent in waging war is duly reflected in
the constitutional theories of states. In the United States, for example,
there are explicit legal provisions to the effect that a decision to engage
the country in a war should be taken by the legislative branch of the
government, the national Congress (which is composed of elected offi-
cials from every section of the community), by majority vote of its
members after having had the opportunity to discuss and debate the
issue of war. 9
History shows, however, that this theory has failed to work on many
occasions.100 From the earliest years of the American Republic, exam-
97. Id.
98. See infra notes 176-206 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
the "legitimacy" factor in the context of the relationship between third parties and
states experiencing civil strife).
99. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. The President, however, retains the power to
"conduct" war (as distinct from making or declaring war) (id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1),
and the responsibility to engage the armed forces in a national emergency created by
an attack upon the United States. War Powers Resolution § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c)
(1982). Nonetheless, it should be noted that under the War Powers Resolution of 1973,
the President must report promptly to Congress any introduction of armed forces into
ongoing or imminent hostilities. Id. at § 1543. Congress must vote to sustain the Presi-
dent's use of the American Armed Forces within a sixty-day period. Id. at § 1544(b).
Clearly, Congress can also govern the use of armed forces through its control of
appropriations.
100. See generally R. Russell, The U.S. Congress and the Power to Use Military
Force Abroad 64-89 (1967) (unpublished manuscript available in the Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy library); Background Information on the Use of United States
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1951) (stating that the
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ples can be found of presidential use of the armed forces without con-
gressional approval. 10 1 Yet it is arguable that in several of these cases
the President was acting in the general context of a popular consensus
in the country that the United States should assume a forceful posture.
As suggested by Rogers, "[w]hatever the reason for presidential initia-
tives . . . they seem to have been responsive to the times and to have
reflected the mood of the Nation. 10 2 An implied acquiescence may be
inferred from the fact that certain measures were taken under the
United Nations Charter that the President was empowered to exe-
cute.10 3 On other occasions, reliance was placed on the "principles of
justice and international law on which peace and stable international
order depend"'1 4 and to which presumably the people generally pledge
their support. A basic approval by the nation of the President's use of
war powers was also claimed to be a feature of any action undertaken
in accordance with the principles enunciated in the OAS Charter. 105
The above attempts to rationalize war initiatives by the President
indicate that the electorate is perceived as the ultimate restraint on the
use of war powers. As recognized by President Nixon in his "State of
the World" message: "Our experience in the 1960's has underlined the
fact that we should not do more abroad than domestic opinion can sus-
tain."106 On practical grounds alone, of course, the authority waging
war must be sensitive to the people's willingness to suffer the potential
physical, economic, and political costs of military actions. Indeed, that
such a notion was at the foundation of the drafting of article I, section
8 of the United States Constitution is revealed in a statement made by
broad Constitutional allocation of war powers between the President and the Congress
invites struggle between these two branches); Frye & Sullivan, Congress and Vietnam,
in THE VIETNAM LEGACY 194, 205-15 (A. Lake ed. 1976) (discussing the relationship
between Congress and the President in the area of foreign affairs since the enactment
of the War Powers Resolution of 1973).
101. See Rogers, Congress, the President and War Powers, in Current Foreign Pol-
icy, Department of State Publication No. 8591, General Foreign Policy Series 255, at
3-5 (June 1961).
102. Id. at 3.
103. Pertinent is the explanation given by the Truman administration with respect
to President Truman's committal of United States forces to a war in Korea without
congressional authorization. Truman, The President's News Conference at Key West,
1951 PUB. PAPERS 189 (Mar. 15, 1951).
104. See Statement made by President Eisenhower in justification of the sending of
United States troops into Lebanon without seeking specific congressional approval, 104
CONG. REC. 13,865 (1958).
105. See Johnson, Commencement Address at Baylor University, 1965 Pun. PA-
PERs 593 (May 28, 1965) (urging Americans to support the dispatch of United States
marines into the Dominican Republic without congressional approval).
106. Nixon, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, 7
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 305 (Feb. 25, 1971).
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an early Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Joseph Story:
The power of declaring war is not only the highest sovereign prerogative; but it
is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the
utmost deliberation and the successive review of all the councils of the nation;
War, in its best state, never fails to impose on the people the most burdensome
taxes and personal sufferings. It is always injurious and sometimes subversive of
the great commercial, manufacturing and agricultural interests. Nay, it always
involves the prosperity, and not unfrequently the existence, of a nation ....
This reasoning appears to have great weight with the convention, and to have
decided its choice. Its judgment has hitherto obtained the unqualified approba-
tion of the country.
1 °'
The reasons which compelled the framers of the United States Consti-
tution to place the power to declare war in Congress appear as compel-
ling today as when the Constitution was written. The issue becomes
whether the rationales offered by former Presidents to commit the na-
tion to war and the varied degrees of compliance with the requirement
for congressional authorization are genuine or "fraud practiced by the
government." Apparently, the need to have public approval is always
presumed,108 and it is the "national interest" that the war-making au-
thorities ought to serve.
Similarly, constitutional directives are designed to provide added re-
straints within the domestic structure on the use of force in interna-
tional society. It is a fact that most states today, even authoritarian
ones, have specific constitutional provisions for the declaration and de-
termination of war.109 A transgression of these provisions by an official
107. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
87-88 (4th ed. 1873).
108. See Somerville, supra note 96, at 77 (stating that war can be conducted only
if individuals agree to participate).
109. See generally CONSTITTrIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blau-
stein & G. Flanz eds. 1971) (compiling the constitutions of the countries of the world).
The Constitution of Argentina empowers the Congress "[t]o authorize the Executive
Power to declare war and make peace." ARGEN. Co T. ch. IV, art. 67, para. 21.
The Constitution of Australia vests the Queen with the power to declare war and the
Governor-General, as the Queen's representative, with the power to implement. AuSTL
CONST. ch. II, § 68.
Under the Constitution of Belgium, the King commands the armed forces and de-
clares war, but must advise the House of Representatives, as soon as security permits.
BELG. CONST. ch. II, § 1, art. 68.
The Constitution of Chile empowers the President of the Republic to "declare war,
with the prior authorization of law, leaving on record that the National Security Coun-
cil has been heard in this regard." CHILE CONST. ch. IV, art. 32, § 21.
The 1982 Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China gives the National
People's Congress the power to "decide on questions of war and peace." P.R.C. CoNsT.
(DRAFT) ch. III, § 1, art. 60, para. 12.
The Constitution of France provides that the President of the Republic takes war
measures after consultation with the Premier, the Presidents of the assemblies, and the
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or state organ would arguably deprive them of their legal power to de-
clare and wage war. Stated differently, a war undertaken without the
appropriate constitutional authority fails to meet the "who" criterion of
just war and therefore may be deemed illegal and unjust. 110 No direct
support can be found for this assertion in positive international law.
Indeed, in light of judicial support of the rule that municipal law can-
not limit the scope of a state's obligations on the international plane,'
it is reasonable to assume that requirements under internal law do not
act to increase a state's international liabilities. Yet, the constitutional-
ity of the powers used to wage war should feature in the overall assess-
ment of its "justness."
Constitutional Council. FR. CONST. tit. 11, art. 16. In practice, however, parliamentary
control of foreign policy has declined in France. Cot, Parliament and Foreign Policy in
France, in PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY 11, 11 (A. Cassese ed.
1980). General De Gaulle, for example, considered foreign policy "a private affair of
the head of state and thus an affair which should not stimulate political debate." Id. at
14.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that "[w]hen the
determination of the existence of a state of defense has been promulgated" by the
Bundestag (Federal Parliament), with the consent of the Bundesrat (the Council of
Constituent States), by a two-third majority of votes cast, "and if the federal territory
is being attacked by armed force, the Federal President may, with the consent of the
Bundestag, issue internationally valid declarations regarding the existence of such a
state of defense ... " W. GER. BASIC LAW § Xa, art. I15a, para. 1, 5 (1949)
(amended 1968).
The Constitution of Mexico provides that the President of Mexico has the power "to
declare war in the name of the United Mexican States, pursuant to a previous law of
the Congress of the Union." MEX. CONST. tit. III, § 3, art. 89, para. VIII.
In the United Kingdom, the declaration of war is part of the area of executive discre-
tion inherent in the crown, meaning the cabinet and the civil service. Brownlie, Parlia-
mentary Control over Foreign Policy in the United Kingdom, in PARLIAMENTARY CON-
TROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY 1, 4 (A. Cassese ed. 1980). See generally J. CHITTY, A
TREATISE OF THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 43-50 (rev. ed. 1968)
(giving a historical perspective of the war prerogative of the English King).
The cabinet and individual ministers, however, are accountable to Parliament for
decisions implemented. Brownlie, supra at 4. History suggests that on a few occasions
the British government took decisions in the area of foreign policy after "secret plan-
ning" and without much regard to Parliament's debates. Id. at 9.
110. See Halperin, American Military Intervention. Is it Ever Justified?, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1030-31 (M. McDougal & W. Reis-
man eds. 1981) (stating that an American decision to intervene in an international
conflict must coincide with the American constitutional process).
111. Alabama Claims Arbitration, 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THlE IN-
TERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 496,
656 (1898); Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or
Speech in the Danzig Territory (Pol. v. Danzig), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at
24 (Advisory Opinion of Feb. 4) (stating that a state cannot rely, as against another
state, on the provisions of the latter's municipal laws, but uniquely on international
law); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167 (Judgment of June 7) (stating that France cannot rely on
her domestic legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations).
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Instructive in this respect is the controversy which surrounded Presi-
dent Johnson's non-compliance with the constitutional requirement of
congressional approval for the United States military involvement in
the Vietnam war. Critics vehemently questioned the war's constitution-
ality, contending that the executive had exceeded its authority and in
effect usurped congressional power to declare war."' It was further as-
serted that citizens had a constitutional right to protection under the
municipal law of the United States, giving rise to a corresponding
duty on the part of the President. In discharging his duty the President
must, however, observe constitutional limits. Indeed, a right of resis-
tance is established against the ruler who had unconstitutionally
usurped power (whether under national or international law) coupled
with a basic right to challenge the obligation to participate in a war
declared by such a ruler through recourse to the courts."""
In fact, even supporters of the American administration who de-
fended the position that the President had the necessary power to com-
mit American forces to a war in Vietnam did not reject the criterion of
"legitimate authority."115 Rather, they sought to establish that such an
authority derived from a variety of alternative sources. 1
112. L. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: THE AIERICAN
SYSTEM IN CRISIS 3-10 (1970) (arguing that the President has exceeded his executive
power beyond constitutional limits regarding the Vietnam War); Velvel, The War in
Vietnam Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdictionally Attackable, in 2 THE VI-
ETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 651-710 (R. Falk ed. 1969) (providing an in-
depth analysis of this issue); see also I.F. Stone, International Law and the Tonkin
Bay Incidents, in THE VIEr-NAM READER 307-15 (M. Raskin & B. Fall eds. 1965)
(stating that the Tonkin Bay incidents breached international law).
113. See Wormuth, The President versus the Constitution, in 2 THE VIETNAM
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 711, 754-55 (noting the recogni-
tion of this right by President Washington in his Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 and
by the United States Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House Cases); see also The
Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter House Co. (Slaughter-House Cases), 83 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1872) (recognizing
a citizen's right to protection under the municipal law); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 15-
16 (1889) (recognizing a citizen's constitutional right to protection under the municipal
law and the President's corresponding duty); I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 1789-1908, 156 (J. Richardson ed. 1968) (providing statements by President
Washington regarding this right).
114. See generally Gottlieb, Vietnam and Civil Disobedience, in 2 THE VIETNAM
WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 611, 615 (holding that citizens
have a right to resist illegitimate authority); L. VELVEL, supra note 112, at 183-250
(arguing for and detailing the legitimate use of civil disobedience in protesting against
the Vietnam War).
115. See Moore, The National Executive and The Use of Armed Forces Abroad.
in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 811 (support-
ing the power of the President to commit American forces without congressional ap-
proval when necessary).
116. VeIvel. The War in Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdiction-
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Nonetheless, the practical legal consequences with respect to the un-
constitutionality of the power to wage war are rather limited, both in
public international law and in domestic law. In the municipal context,
courts have demonstrated a general reluctance to rule on the legality of
war, relying either on the argument that individuals have no standing
to challenge the war or that their claims are a "political question"
whose resolution is entrusted exclusively to the Executive.' 17 At the in-
ternational level, while the International Court of Justice has occasion-
ally pronounced on matters involving the use of force,118 it may be le-
gitimately observed that "[t~he record of I.C.J. force cases is a series of
denials, revocations or reservations of jurisdiction, nonappearances
before the court and refusals to comply with court directives."'1 9
ally Attackable, in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112,
at 655-81 (summarizing arguments based on these alternative sources and individually
rejecting them as having little or no merit). Some of these sources include the power to
repel attack, the President's power under treaties, the President as chief executive, the
commander-in-chief clause, the President's general foreign policy power, the President
as a representative of all the people, the fait accompli argument, lack of formal con-
gressional disapproval, and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Id.
117. See Note, The War Powers Resolution: A Tool for Balancing Power Through
Negotiation, 70 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1049 (1984) (noting that even the passage of the
War Powers Resolution in 1970 has not changed the stance of the United States).
"[S]hort of a constitutional impasse over the appropriate balance of power between the
executive and legislature, the political question doctrine still bars judicial involvement
in executive decisions to commit United States troops without congressional authoriza-
tion." Id.; Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that
the judiciary will not become involved in executive decisions unless a constitutional
impasse appropriate for judicial resolution was involved). But see Velvel, The War in
Vietnam: Unconstitutional, Justiciable and Jurisdictionally Attackable, in 2 THE VI-
ETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 112, at 681-705 (concluding that
the question of legitimate authority is a critical one that the courts should decide in the
exercise of their traditional function of assessing where the divisions of power lie in the
federal government); A.W. Thomas & A.J. Thomas, Jr., Presidential War-Making
Power: A Political Question?, 35 Sw. L.J. 879, 882-97 (1981) (analyzing the specific
issue of the political question in the context of the exercise of war powers).
118. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24) (analyzing the taking of American hostages by
Iran); Nuclear Tests (Austi. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 453 (Judgment of
Dec. 20) (involving complaints by Australia and New Zealand against France regard-
ing atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons by the French government in the Pacific
Ocean area); The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9)
(settling dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania regarding damage done to
British warships due to Albania's mining of the Corfu Channel).
119. Note, Separation of Powers Within the United Nations: A Revised Role for
the International Court of Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 165, 167-68 (1985) (stating that
when the International Court of Justice has "attempted to adjudicate use of force
cases, respondent governments have denied or revoked jurisdiction, have refused to ap-
pear, and have balked at complying with court orders"); cf. U.S. Withdrawal From
Proceeding Initiated by Nicaragua in the I.C.J., 85 DEP'T ST. BULL. 64 (March 1985)
(stating that the United States based its decision to withdraw from the proceedings
initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice on the contention that the
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4. The "Lawful Authority" to Request Intervention
The relevance of the auctoritas principas criterion manifests itself
more clearly when discussing the legitimacy of a government's invita-
tion for third-party intervention. Generally, only a competent authority
in the incumbent regime may invite and accept foreign intervention.
Applying this principle, however, often stirs great controversy, because
the core of the conflict in such a situation usually involves a struggle
for power and authority. For instance, identifying the locus of authority
in S. Vietnam as the N.L.F., the rightful claimants to political power,
proved difficult.
Questions also arise as to the duration of the incumbent regime's
authority. Specifically, the issue of authority is raised at the point
where revolutionary resistance is so successful, and/or the regime's
counter-insurgency measures are so unsuccessful, that the regime ap-
pears to lack both the political-military base and the legal-moral legiti-
macy to warrant its continuation of a counter-insurgency campaign.
Arguably, at that point the incumbent regime also loses its competence
to invite external assistance.120
Less controversial, however, are situations involving no insurgency or
internal revolt. Consensus has prevailed among international lawyers on
the legality of an external intervention occasioned by an explicit invita-
tion genuinely extended by the legitimate government of a state.1 2 Yet,
doubts may emerge concerning the status of that government as the
legitimate authority under international law. Generally, the invitation
or consent must be given freely, without pressure, by the duly consti-
tuted and representative government, and it must reflect the true will of
the people of that state. Indeed, criticisms of the interventions in Hun-
gary in 1956 and in Afghanistan in 1979 reflect the application of these
criteria. Thus, with respect to the former, Quincy Wright argued that
"unless Hungary, through the voice of an adequately established gov-
ernment requested Soviet aid. . . the Soviet action was aggression." ' 2
Wright further argued that "the consent of a state cannot be deduced
from the request of a puppet government acting in its name but set up
dispute is "an inherently political problem and is not appropriate for judicial resolu-
tion" and the World Court is "patently unsuited" to decide it).
120. See W. O'BRIEN, supra note 94, at 159, 334 (expressing the alternate view
that a regime may invite intervention at any time in the course of a civil war unless it
is so clearly tyrannical and lacking in support and acceptance as to forfeit that right).
121. See R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 210-13 (1963) (analyzing the argument
that a claim to use force is legal when it is based on an invitation from another state).
122. Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 275 (1957).
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by foreign intervention. ' 23 In a similar vein, the United States ambas-
sador to the United Nations asserted with regard to the Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan, that if any invitation was received by the
Soviets it had been issued by the Communist Party rather than the
government of Afghanistan, and that the regime of the day had no
legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. 24 Interestingly, the Soviet
jurists also employed the same test when expressing the view that the
request by South Vietnam for American military assistance derived
merely from consent given by an unrepresentative government under
undue pressure. 
25
A more recent event which highlights the relevance of the "legiti-
mate authority" criterion is the Grenada invasion on October 25, 1983.
The United States government legally justified the invasion by contend-
ing that Grenada's own government invited external intervention into
its domestic affairs.1 26 Specifically, the Reagan administration empha-
sized the legal and political importance of the Governor-General's invi-
tation in regard to the decision by the United States, and other coun-
tries of the joint force, to intervene. The Governor-General remained
the sole source of governmental legitimacy on the island in the wake of
the tragic events. The United States and the member countries of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States accorded his appeal excep-
tional moral and legal weight, because the invitation of lawful govern-
mental authority constitutes a recognized basis under international law
for foreign states to provide requested assistance. 2 7 While opinions dif-
fer as to whether the Governor-General was indeed vested with the ap-
propriate legal authority to request an external intervention, 12 8 it is ap-
123. Id.
124. See J. Kirkpatrick, Afghan Situation and Implications for Peace, 82 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 57, 58 (Jan. 1982) (stating that the Soviet Union was invited to intervene in
Afghanistan not by the Afghan government but rather by the Afghan Communist
Party).
125. Butler, Soviet Attitude Toward Intervention in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 381, 391 (J. Norton Moore ed. 1974).
126. Statement by Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Nov. 2, 1983), reprinted in 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 203
(1984).
127. Id.
128. See Joyner, The US Action in Grenada, Reflections on the Lawfulness of In-
vasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 138-39 (1984). "Whether Governor-General Scoon in
fact 'remained the sole source of governmental legitimacy' on Grenada after October
24, 1983 is both arguable and unclear. That he alone possessed sufficient legal and
constitutional authority at that time to legitimate an official invitation for US and
OECS military forces to intervene also seems polemical." Id.; see also Vagts, Interna-
tional Law Under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-Home Examination, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 169, 170-71 (1984) (adopting an equally critical approach). But see
Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 159-
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parent that the "legitimate authority" criterion is commonly adopted in
evaluating the justification of a military offensive.
5. The "Responsibility" Element
The significance of the auctoritas principas criterion also becomes
evident when ascertaining responsibility for initiating the war. From
the perspective of both the international community and the nationals
of the individual state, it is essential to identify the "legitimate author-
ity" in order to attribute reponsibility. This aspect has become particu-
larly relevant since the Charter of the Nuremberg International Mili-
tary Tribunal defined "crimes against peace" as including the
"planning, preparation, initiation and waging of a war of aggression or
a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurance, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment
of any of the foregoing." 128 Given the criminality of the act of
war-regardless of whether it is indeed a crime susceptible to legal
proof and judicial determination' 3 -- it is even more important that the
legitimate authority that undertakes war appropriately account for any
transgression of accepted norms.
Yet, the legitimacy of the authority waging the war--or, for that
matter, the ultimate justice or injustice of the war-is irrelevant to the
criminality of the actions of individual combatants. Those who fight in
"unjust" wars and abide by the laws of war should not be subject to
prosecution under any construction of the Nuremberg principles. Simi-
larly, the fact that a soldier acted in pursuance of orders issued by the
"legitimate authority" would not free him from criminal responsibil-
ity.131 Further, superior officers are not relieved from such responsibilty
because they did not give the illegal orders to their subordinates. 132
Stated differently, international law attributes no specific legal signifi-
cance to the "legitimate authority" criterion in this context. This does
not, however, obviate the need to identify the leaders responsible for
the exercise of war powers in order to make value judgments with re-
61 (1984) (expressing strong support for the view that the Governor-General enjoyed
such an authority).
129. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
185-94 (1963) (presenting evidence that crimes against peace, as defined in the Char-
ters of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, have been ac-
cepted as a part of positive law since 1946).
130. See Warnke, Individual Responsibility in Warfare, in LAW AND RESPONSI-
BILITY IN VARFARE 187-93 (P. Trooboff ed. 1975).
131. CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 8.
132. Id.
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spect to their actions. Furthermore, given that one can seldom establish
responsibility in absolute terms, the question of "legitimate authority"
may prove useful in seeking to establish the balance of culpability.
Domestically, it is desirable that members of the community, the
principal victims of the suffering induced by war, be assured of a clear
identification of the war-making authority that would bear the guilt.
Indeed, the public's acquiescence in war is arguably conditioned by the
knowledge that its leaders must answer to the nation should those lead-
ers wrongly embark upon a war. Recent cases in point are the strong
public reactions to the exercise of authority during the wars in the
Falklands ss and Lebanon1 34 respectively.
6. Action by United Nations Organs
Thus far the discussion of "legitimate authority" has focused on war-
making powers employed by national authorities. In the context of
evaluating this criterion of just war, however, are other sources of au-
thority which lie outside the jurisdiction of the individual state and
which are sanctioned under contemporary international law. Particu-
larly relevant are actions specified in chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter which empowers the Security Council, when it considers that
non-military enforcement action is "inadequate," to "take such action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security." Thus, the Charter confers on the Se-
curity Council the authority to determine the existence of a valid cause
and to use force accordingly. Such a broad authority stands in marked
contrast to the decision-making process under the Covenant of the
League of Nations,135 which allowed member states to decide for them-
selves whether another member state had resorted to war in violation of
its obligations under the Covenant. Nonetheless, the United Nations
Charter appears to reflect a greater sense of political realism, given the
divergence of states' interests, loyalties, and perceptions.
133. 23 KEESING'S ARCHIVES 32553A (Dec. 1983).
134. Questions were raised, for example, by members of the Knesset (the Israeli
Parliament) as to "whether the army acted on the basis of decisions consistent with
constitutional provisions?" Protocol of the 10th Knesset, 3d Sess., 214th Sitting,
15.6.83, at 46. The answer given to this query reaffirmed the need for authoritative
decision by the duly constituted government with respect to "the aims of the war and
military moves of special importance, especially when the Prime Minister considers
these moves to have political ramifications." Id. at 407. It was not, however, viewed as
desirable that the cabinet as a whole should deal with tactical military details which
did not concern matters of strategic principle. Id. at 47.
135. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10, para. I (establishing the policy
of making decisions in the League of Nations).
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At the same time, nothing in the United Nations Charter or in the
machinery of the international system limits a state's right to deter-
mine for itself whether an act of aggression has occurred or force has
been used illegally. In practice, the Security Council is virtually pre-
cluded by its voting rules from making such a determination. Indeed,
the failure by the permanent members to agree on the availability of
armed forces has rendered the decision-making authority of the Coun-
cil, regarding the use of force, null.13 In the absence of special agree-
ments concluded between the Council and member states, the Council
has been unable to make binding decisions to use force. Any measures
taken by the United Nations or under its auspices requiring the use of
armed forces have been based on voluntary contributions, hence the
concept of a Security Council acting in concert and supported by a
permanent peace-keeping force contemplated under the Charter has
not met expectations.
The stalemate in the Security Council has encouraged attempts to
extend the power to use armed force to the General Assembly. Indeed,
the constant pressure of a large number of states (particularly third
world and non-aligned states) for further expansion of independent
General Assembly activity, at the expense of that of the Security Coun-
cil, in matters of maintaining, restoring and enforcing international
peace and security, has become a conspicuous feature of United Na-
tions politics.
Arguably, article 24 of the Charter gives the Security Council
merely the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security," and hence does not preclude the General Assem-
bly from exercising a secondary or residual responsibility. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice in fact endorsed such an argument in its advi-
sory proceedings on Certain Expenses of the United Nations,1 37 which
upheld to a certain degree the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution.a
This resolution, in turn, enhanced the General Assembly's ability to
136. See U.N. CARTER arts. 43-47 (establishing the United Nations agreement
regarding the involvement of armed forces to maintain peace, the determination of
when to sue this force, the utilization of armed force in an emergency situation, and the
creation of a committee to oversee the application of military force).
137. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 162-63 (Advisory
Opinion of July 20).
138. See G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775
(1950) (establishing a resolution to unite nations in order to maintain security and
peace by developing the Security Council as a functioning body responsible for ensur-
ing a peaceful environment); Proposals for Strengthening World Peace, 1950
U.N.Y.B. 193-95 (recognizing the General Assembly's obligation to adhere to the
United Nation's responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and rec-
ommending proposals to unite nations in peaceful harmony).
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discharge its secondary or residual responsibility by streamlining the
procedure for calling special sessions of the General Assembly. Further,
if the Security Council failed in its primary responsibility for maintain-
ing international peace and security, the General Assembly should con-
sider the matter immediately, with a view to making recommendations
for collective action, including the use of armed force when necessary.
At the same time article 11(2) of the Charter stipulates that "any
...question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Se-
curity Council by the General Assembly... "19 thus implying that
the Security Council is granted a "monopoly" on "action." In the Ex-
penses case, the International Court of Justice further interpreted
''action" to mean "enforcement action"-an interpretation employed in
explaining why the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle
East-established in 1956 by the General Assembly and not designed
to take enforcement action-had not conflicted with article 11(2). The
court's opinion thus lends itself to the construction that the General
Assembly would have acted illegally had it set up a force designed to
take enforcement action. Put another way, the United Nations Charter
restricts the General Assembly to the recommendation of measures
which are not coercive, namely ones which are of a "peace-keeping"
rather than of a "collective security" nature.
The issue of "legitimate authority" in the context of the United Na-
tions collective measures is, however, by no means resolved. The diver-
gence of opinions in this respect manifested itself, for instance, during
the debates preceding the adoption of the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States."" The sensitivity of the Soviet Union and other East European
socialist countries regarding this question, evident in their opposition to
139. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1I, para. 2 (recognizing the authority of the General
Assembly to ensure global peace and security).
140. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 165, 171-72 (Advi-
sory Opinion of July 20).
141. See U.N. Doc. A/5356 (Agenda Item 75), at 1-28 (1962) (reporting on the
proposal of the Consideration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations). The declaration contains nineteen objectives for the following pur-
poses: 1) maintaining peace; 2) settling disputes; 3) prohibiting the use of force;
4) prohibiting the use of force for mass destruction; 5) contemplating total disarma-
ment; 6) prohibiting war propaganda; 7) discussing collective bargaining; 8) examining
state sovereignty; 9) determining territorial inviolability; 10) noting state's indepen-
dence; 11) recognizing sovereign equality; 12) participating in states' rights regarding
international relations; 13) examining non-intervention; 14) discussing self-determina-
tion; 15) elimination of colonialism; 16) dealing with human rights elements; 17) coop-
erating in economic, social and cultural fields; 18) observing international obligations;
and 19) examining states' responsibility. Id. at 2.
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such a concept, and traceable to the adoption of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, split the committee considering the issue. The socialist
group4 vehemently argued that the decision to set in motion the
mechanism of coercion lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Se-
curity Council. Other states contended that the recommendations of
the General Assembly in accordance with articles 10 and 11143 of the
Charter, with respect to the maintenance of international peace and
security, might also furnish an institutional vehicle for applying force
should the Security Council find itself unable to act.144 Accordingly,
many proposals at the Conference were couched in broad terms to pro-
vide for the use of force "on the basis of the decision by a competent
organ of the United Nations. '"14" No agreement, however, was reached
on whether the Security Council is the only United Nations organ com-
petent to authorize the lawful use of force, or whether the General As-
sembly was also competent.1 46 The Definition of Aggression did not re-
solve this issue. In fact, as suggested by Stone, "[the new definition of
aggression ...has surrounded the whole area of peace enforcement
with an ever denser entanglement of doubts and ideologically and eco-
nomically based conflicts of interpretation about the limits of lawful
use of force." 147 Stone himself nonetheless forecasts that "there is
142. See Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doec. A/AC.125/SR.26, at
4 (1966) (recognizing Czechoslovakia's legitimate right to control as the country so
chooses); Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doec. A/AC.125/SR.62, at 9 (1967)
(stressing the Security Council's obligation to take forceful action, specifically in
Czechoslovakian matters, in exerting its control over international conflicts); see also
Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/SR.88, at 6 (1968) (recogniz-
ing the importance of a principle of cooperation with Romania, the involvement of the
Security Council, and the Romanian delegation's contribution to this concept).
143. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 10, 11 (determining the General Assembly's function
and power with respect to any situation, specifically the maintenance of universal se-
curity and peace).
144. See Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doec. A/AC.I 19/L.34/Add.
1, at para. 7 (1964) (defining the term "force" in the context of political or economic
pressure).
145. See Special Committtee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 119/L. 15, at
para. 3 (1964) (recognizing the joint proposal of Ghana, India, and Yugoslavia to use
armed force when permitted by the United Nations).
146. See Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, U.N. Doc. A/5746, at 51 (1964)
(recognizing the lack of consensus with respect to the sole authority granted to the
Security Council, that is the responsibility of permitting the lawful use of force).
147. See Stone, supra note 42, at 246 (noting the problems regarding the concept
of aggression in dealing with international conflicts).
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likely to be a continuing if not an increasing shortfall of Security Coun-
cil performance in this area and therefore room for extension of the
General Assembly's activity by analogy with that under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution after 1950. " 148
Apart from the general question of the competence of the General
Assembly in matters concerning recourse to force, the application of
the "legitimate authority" criterion to actions authorized by a United
Nations organ involves also problems of constitutionality. The latter
arise particularly when resolutions of either the General Assembly or
the Security Council fail to comply with the requirements laid down in
the Charter. Indeed, critics 9 emphasized this aspect in challenging the
legality of the war in Korea, or, specifically, Security Council resolu-
tions of June 25150 and 27151 and July 7, 1950,151 which purported to
provide the formal basis for enforcement action.
It was contended that the June 25, 1950 resolution calling for imme-
diate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal by the North Korean au-
thorities of their armed forces could not constitute a legitimate authori-
zation of "enforcement action" under the United Nations Charter.
Rather, it merely applied article 40 and called on the parties concerned
to comply with the "provisional measures" it deemed necessary. Simi-
larly, the June 27, 1950 resolution failed to comply with the required
authorizing procedure, employing instead the form of recommendation
normally reserved for non-military measures under article 39 of the
148. See id. (recognizing the reduction of the Security Council's ability to enforce
peace among nations).
149. See H. KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 927-
49 (1951) (describing the United Nations action in the Korean situation specifically
involving the resolutions adopted by the Security Council); J. STONE, LEGAL CON-
TROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 228-37 (1954) (assessing the obligations of
United Nations to comply with Security Council resolutions in the Korean crisis);
Kunz, Legality of the Security Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, 45 AM.
J. INT'L L. 137, 138 (1951) (noting the ineffectiveness of the Security Council's resolu-
tion to rectify conflicts arising from the Korean War); Gross, Korea: A Study of U.S.
Policy in the United States (Book Review), 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 163, 165 (1958) (dis-
cussing the lack of authority given to the United Nations with respect to enforcement
actions in Korea).
150. See Resolution Concerning the Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic
of Korea, U.N. Doc. S/1501 (1950) (establishing United Nations jurisdiction over the
Korean situation and developing requests to be implemented upon Korea).
151. See Resolution Concerning the Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic
of Korea, U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950) (recognizing the Security Council's responsibilities
over the Korean situation and supporting their efforts in this matter).
152. See Resolution Concerning the Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic
of Korea, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950) (recommending that the United Nations follow its
Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950 in order to resolve the Korean conflict).
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Charter. 153 The resolution of July 7, 1950 also failed to provide the
necessary authorization for United Nations enforcement action in view
of its classification of the action taken by United Nations members in
Korea as "collective self-defense." Had the Security Council subse-
quently intervened, characterization of the enforcement action would
have been constitutionally inappropriate.
Similarly, the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951 was
ultra vires to the Uniting for Peace Resolution under which it had pur-
portedly been drafted'" and hence could not furnish the legal authori-
zation necessary for enforcement action under the United Nations
Charter. Such constitutional problems may also give rise to a related
complication, stemming from an allegedly ultra vires conduct by forces
acting with the authority of an apparently valid resolution. 21  While it
is questionable whether the United Nations acting ultra vires might be
guilty of aggression,""6 some states regarding such an act as illegal
would render aid in collective defense to the state that committed the
initial aggressive act. 15 Again, the situation does not lend itself to easy
solutions but at the same time it reinforces the significance of the "le-
gitimate authority" criterion and the need for its careful application
with a view to minimizing opportunities for recourse to force.
7. Action by Regional Organizations
Of equal importance is the "legitimate authority" criterion in the
context of use of force pursuant to action of a regional organization
"relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" as
provided in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.""' Generally,
regional peacekeeping operations consistent with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations are lawful so long as they are undertaken
153. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (stating the Security Council's obligations with
respect to breach of or threats to peace and the Council's authority to maintain inter-
national peace).
154. See KELSEN, supra note 149, at 986-90 (comparing the implications of the
Uniting for Peace Resolution to the February 1, 1951 resolution).
155. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
334-36 (1963) (discussing the validity of Security Council resolutions, specifically to
the Soviet criticism of the United Nations' action in the Congo in 1960).
156. See id. at 335 (discussing the problems arising from the Security Council act-
ing ultra vires in certain situations).
157. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Advisory
Opinion of July 20) (recognizing that third parties may defer to the Security Council
acting ultra vires with respect to the internal operations of the United Nations).
158. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 52-54 (establishing the function of the regional orga-
nizations to maintain peace in their region as well as in a global nature).
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at the initiative of a genuinely independent regional arrangementDO
The identification of an arrangement as a "regional" one, however,
presents difficulties, particularly since this concept is not defined in the
United Nations Charter. Disagreements result as to whether regional
character should be determined on the basis of membership, geographi-
cal position, or the subject-matter regulated by the arrangement."'
Such a controversy surrounded the recognition of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The absence of reference to "enforce-
ment measures . . . in case a conflict between two or more members of
the Union"' 61 added to the controversy. The NATO Treaty, however,
fulfilled all the requirements of a regional agreement under chapter
VIII.'6 2 While attempts to construe strictly permissible sources of law-
ful uses of force, the Charter seems to allow contradictory
interpretation. 6 3
Further problems stem from uncertainty concerning the extent of the
authority of a regional arrangement and its compatability with ar-
rangements of the Security Council. Diverging views-that parallel the
disagreement concerning actions by United Nations organs1 4 -also
manifest themsleves in the conflicting constructions of the relevant
clauses of the Charter, and particularly article 53 which stipulates:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise. . . regional arrangements
or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement ac-
tion shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without
the authorisation of the Security Council ....
Western states have narrowly interpreted the term "enforcement ac-
159. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1 (stipulating the existence of regional com-
mittees to ensure international peace and security). The Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Pur-
poses and Principles of the United Nations.
Id.
160. See Akehurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies with Special Refer-
ence to the Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y.B.. INT'L L. 175, 175-76
(1967) (discussing the problems of determining what constitutes a regional arrange-
ment and the other factors related to distinguishing regional agencies).
161. See W. BECKETT, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, THE BRUSSELS TREATY
AND THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONs 21 (1950) (stating the provision in the
North Atlantic Treaty bringing to the forefront regional arrangements).
162. See Kelsen, Is the North Atlantic Treaty a Regional Arrangement?, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 162, 163 (1951) (quoting the North Atlantic Treaty's role in restricting the
exercise of certain powers).
163. Id. at 166.
164. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing the varying points
of view with respect to the regional arrangements authority).
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tion" with a view to extending the authority of regional organizations.
The United States and most of its fellow members of the Organization
of American States (OAS) advocated such an interpretation, in rela-
tion to the Dominican Republic intervention 5 and the Cuban quaran-
tine.166 A similar interpretation also found expression in the discus-
sions 167 about the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States6 8 and the Definition of Ag-
gression,"" although the "Thirteen Powers" took a contrasting stand in
their Draft Definition of Aggression. 7 ° It appears, however, that the
latter proposal presumed to rewrite article 53 of the Charter, first by
inserting the proviso that governs not only article 53 "enforcement ac-
tion" but "any use of armed force" by regional agencies, as governed
by article 53, and second, by specifying that states may resort to such
expanded use of force only "if there is a decision to that effect by the
Security Council". The definition of aggression nonetheless proved yet
again unviable for resolving differences of the kind surrounding the
165. See 15 U.N. SCOR (983d mtg.) at 9, 12, 13 UN Doc. S/PV. 893 (1960)
(expressing the USSR's support of the Security Council's involvement in the Domini-
can Republic); see also id. at 46 (stating the United Kingdom's position with respect to
the Dominican Republic's situation).
It is the view of my delegation that when Article 53 refers to 'enforcement ac-
tion[,'] it must be contemplating the exercise of force in a manner which would
not normally be legitimate for any State or group of States except under the
authority of the Security Council. Other pacifying actions under regional ar-
rangements as envisaged under Chapter VIII of the Charter which do not come
into this category have simply to be brought to the attention of the Security
Council under Article 54.
Id.
166. See Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 41 DEP'T ST. BuLL.
763, 764 (1962) (comparing the actions of the regional organizations to the United
Nations obligations to control the use of enforcement action, specifically in the Cuban
quarantine situation); Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 A.!. J. INV'L L.
515, 519-20 (1963) (illustrating how the regional organization duties, augmented while
under the obligations of the Security Council, diminished during the Cuban
quarantine).
167. See U.N. Doc. A/Ac.1 19/L.B, at 2, para. 5 (1964) (describing the legal au-
thority of the United Nations, based on the power granted by the Charter, to apply
forceful means to situations of international strife). "Use of force ... pursuant to
decisions of or authorizations by . . . regional organizations consistent with the Char-
ter of the United Nations . . . ." Id.
168. Id.
169. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression Draft Proposal
submitted by Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, A/AC.134/L.17 and Adds. I
& 2 (1969) (limited series not for deposit).
170. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Draft Proposal
Submitted by Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana, Guyana, Haita, Iran, Madagascar,
Mexico, Spain, Uganda, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia, A/AC.134/L.16 and Adds. I & 2
(1969).
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construction of article 53.
The Grenadan operation affords a recent illustration of the persistent
disagreement in this domain of international law. Arguments put for-
ward in justification of that operation underscore a rather subtle point:
that actions of the type involved in Grenada are not directed against a
government as sanctions, but instead are focused on restoring order and
orderly processes of self-determination. Such actions do not amount to
"enforcement action" under article 53 and may be undertaken without
the Security Council's approval.
17 1
In fact, the United States presented a similar argument during the
Security Council debate on the 1965 OAS Dominican Republic crisis,
another instance where regional peacekeeping actions occurred. 1 Ad-
ditional support for this point may be found in the I.C.J. decision in
Certain Expenses of the United Nations,173  which considered
peacekeeping actions not directed against, but undertaken with the per-
mission of the constitutional authorities, not to be enforcement
actions.1
74
Whether classified as "peacekeeping" or "enforcement," the Gre-
nada operation touches on another key aspect of "authority," namely
the identification of the "designated regional organization." One view
expressed recognizes the OAS as the "only collective agency mandated
by the regional community of states to maintain international peace
and security for the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the UN."117 5 Accordingly, members of the Or-
ganization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) could not lawfully au-
171. See Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L
L. 145, 155-56 (1984) (justifying the United States invasion into Grenada as a reason-
able peacekeeping action). The United Nations would not condone the invasion as it
was executed, in response to a request for assistance, nor as a crusade to further the
hegemony of a foreign state. Id.
172. See 20 U.N. SCOR (1220th mtg.) at 56-60, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1220 (1965)
(recognizing that the purpose of the involvement of the Inter-American Force in the
Dominican Republic was not to intervene but rather to establish an atmosphere of
peace, cooperation, and protection of human rights); 20 U.N. SCOR (1222d mtg.) at
22, 27, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1222 (1965) (arguing that the United Nations Charter
clearly gave the OAS authority to take action in the Dominican Republic crisis).
173. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 197 (Advisory
Opinion of July 20).
174. See Moore, supra note 171, at 155 (noting that regional peacekeeping actions
taken pursuant to constitutional authorities, such as those in the Dominican case, are
not "enforcement actions" under article 53 of the Charter).
175. See Boyle, Chayes, Dore, Falk, Fenrider, Ferguson, Fine, Nunes & Weston,
International Lawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 172-73 (1984) (suggesting
that the OAS was the only collective agency mandated by the regional community of
states to maintain international peace and security for the Western Hemisphere).
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thorize the United States invasion of Grenada,'7 0 a conclusion which
may engender further controversy.
B. OTHER PARTICIPANTS
1. Neutral States
Examining the nature of neutrality and its place in the doctrine of
war shows that this principle effectively removes certain actors from
the arena of international warfare and thus curtails their war-making
powers and maneuverability. Neutrality, which is conventionally ex-
pressed in the language of rights, is an aspect of state sovereignty. Im-
pliedly, in any prospective or ongoing conflict between two other par-
ties, states have the right to adopt the position of "thirdness" and
benefit from the neutral rights that accompany the status. Neutrality is
thus a voluntary act which a state may undertake at will with respect
to any war. Generally, neutrality may exist without reference to the
moral character of the belligerent powers or to the probable outcome of
the war. Rather, it stems from the conviction that the coercion inherent
in war should not extend beyond the limits dictated by the material
causes of the conflict and the military organization of the states in-
volved. At least one group of people, citizens of the neutral state who
do not choose to risk their lives, should be protected from the effects of
armed conflict.
For these reasons, violations of neutral rights are normally consid-
ered a particularly reprehensible kind of aggression, lending support to
the popular view that it is worse to strike out at uninvolved states than
at states with which one is at war. The status of neutrality, however, is
not sacred or inviolable. History furnishes numerous illustrations of the
vulnerability of neutral rights to claims of just and unjust belliger-
ents.17 7 Infringements of such rights in the name of "necessity," "su-
preme emergency," or "higher aims' 78 have been particularly
176. See Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, June
18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 1166 (1981) (noting that article 8, paragraph 4 of the Treaty
prevents member nations of the OECS from authorizing an invasion such as the U.S.
invasion of Grenada). The Treaty limits the power of member states to authorize an
invasion only in situations amounting to "external agression." Id. Even in such situa-
tions, the states may act only in accordance with the right of individual or collective
self-defense as recognized by the OAS Charter, as well as article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.
177. See M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 240-50 (1980) (referring to the
German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914 as an act not to protect Germany's
survival, but merely to improve their odds of victory).
178. See id. at 245 (justifying the British intervention into neutral Norway in 1940
as an act necessary to protect the independence of all the smaller European countries).
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common.
Generally, if third parties believe that one of the belligerents is an
aggressor or that the conflagration is likely to bring calamity, they are
more likely to become involved. Statements reflecting this assumption
have often been made since World War II by moralists who ponder:
"How can any state stand and watch the destruction of a neighbor?
How can the rest of us respect its right to stand and watch if, by violat-
ing this right, we might avert the destruction?"11 9
Such a moral stand is particularly emphasized in the context of a
great power's campaign of conquest, aimed not merely at a particular
state, but at a larger ideological or imperial goal. In fact, a common
argument is that "aggression anywhere threatens everyone" and thus
no state can assume a neutral posture and reap the benefits of other
states' efforts to contain, at a substantial cost, hostilities.
President Wilson embraced this position in his war message of April
2, 1917 when he proclaimed that "[n]eutrality is no longer feasible or
desirable when the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its
people."' 180 Wilson's statement drew considerable support, particularly
from the highly regarded scholar Kunz who asserted that the "law of
neutrality . . . broke down in the world war and did not protect the
neutrals . . . . Neutrality is no more possible in fact and no more de-
sirable in law." 18'
Nor did the situation appear to have changed in the post Second
World War era. With aggression an international crime, neutrality be-
came a connivance in this crime.'82 Indeed, the emphasis on war guilt
and the proceedings of the Nuremberg trial, which gave effect to the
principle of collective security embodied in the League of Nations Cov-
enant, the Kellogg Pact, and the United Nations Charter, further dis-
Churchill argued that, given the exigent circumstances that Germany's aggression cre-
ated, Norway's neutral rights would have to temporarily "fade away." Id.
179. See id. at 233 (noting that although states certainly possess the right to re-
main neutral, they often make a moral decision to become involved in armed conflict,
in order to help protect their neighbors from an aggressor).
180. See STAFF, SOCIAL SCIENCES I, UNIV. CHICAGO, THE PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE -
READINGS IN THE FORMULATING OF AMERICAN POLICY 354, 361-67 (1949) (urging the
United States to relinquish its 1914 policy of neutrality and instead become aligned
with other democratic nations in an effort to maintain worldwide peace).
181. See Kunz, Covenant of the League of Nations and Neutrality, 29 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 36, 36-42 (1935) (recognizing that although the reasons for neutrality
are manifold, it is no longer realistic or practical for a nation to remain neutral in a
world of international solidarity and interdependent communities).
182. See Korovin, The Second World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT'L
L. 742, 753 (1946) (realizing that the concept of neutrality is no longer applicable to
contemporary international disputes; neither a great power nor a weak country can
remain on the "outside").
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couraged any notion of indifference to the causes of war. Furthermore,
the high degree of interdependence which characterizes the present in-
ternational system has rendered the pursuit of genuine neutrality a dif-
ficult task. As Orvik has elaborated:
With trade, industry, communication and ideologies woven tightly together, the
problem becomes basically the same all over the world. No nation is a world by
itself; all are smaller or greater parts of the same whole. Thus no state can truth-
fully declare that the problems of other states are none of its concern. Such a
declaration would be an outright denial of facts. Any state regardless of how
small and insignificant it may appear to be, is nevertheless a part of the whole
world system, and as a member of the world community it has a duty to make up
its mind as to the solution of the problems that will determine the future of the
world ... In the realistic interrelated world of today, a true, impartial and legal
neutrality is impossible. 18
Thus, a community-wide interest exists in controlling military conflict,
and even states not directly involved in a dispute have a duty to support
the side whose cause is deemed just.
Apart from the moral unacceptability of noninvolvement in the face
of aggression and the nonfeasibility on practical grounds of such a pos-
ture, the extent to which neutrality applies in contemporary conven-
tional international law appears limited. Clearly, United Nations mem-
bers cannot maintain neutrality (at least of the traditional type) if the
Security Council imposes military or economic sanctions under Chapter
VII of the Charter. In principle, no member of the United Nations is
entitled, at its discretion, to remain neutral in a war in which the Se-
curity Council has found a particular state guilty of a breach of the
peace or of an act of aggression and called upon the member of the
United Nations concerned either to declare war upon that state or to
take military action indistinguishable from war. This duty is the cumu-
lative effect of article 2(5) of the Charter,"8 in which members under-
take to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the Charter; of article 25,188 in which members un-
dertake to accept and to comply with the decisions of the Security
Council; and of the provisions of chapter VII of the Charter involving
183. See N. ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY 1914-1941 277 (1971) (noting
that because of the current tendency for states to function as groups, bound together by
economic, cultural, and ideological ties, they rarely are able to follow independent poli-
cies such as neutrality).
184. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5 (stating that all member nations shall un-
dertake to give the United Nations assistance in any action it takes in accordance with
the Charter).
185. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25 (stating that all member nations agree to accept
and to comply with the decisions of the Security Council).
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"enforcement action. 186 Thus, when an authorized, and therefore law-
ful force is being used against an aggressor state, neutrality toward
that state would violate the positive obligations assumed by members
under the Charter. 7
Reasonably cogent arguments do nonetheless favor establishing a
continuing scope for neutrality within the United Nations Charter.68
The formal prescriptions of the Charter against neutrality leave many
gaps through which states may pursue permissible non-participation.
First, neither the Charter nor resolutions of the United Nations bind
non-members, who can thus maintain a neutral status regardless of Se-
curity Council decisions. Furthermore, a binding obligation for United
Nations members arises only in the context of "decisions" (as distinct
from "recommendations") by the Security Council, preserving, there-
fore, the option of neutrality in cases where the Security Council can-
not arrive at decisions. The possibility of neutrality is also not ruled out
when measures imposed by the Security Council under article 41 or 42
are solely of an economic nature. In fact, so long as the Security Coun-
cil has not concluded any agreements on armed forces in accordance
with article 43, there is no obligation to participate and the opportunity
of neutrality is still available. By the same token, a country may find
itself free to take a neutral stand if exempted by the Security Council
under article 48 from participation in military measures.
Some scholars8 9 attempt to demonstrate not only that a considerable
legal scope for neutrality exists within United Nations law, but also
that its importance in practice has substantially increased in view of
the failure of the securtiy system envisaged in the Charter to become
an effective force in the management of international conflict. Yet, neu-
186. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (giving the Security Council power to call
upon its members to take collective action against nations who threaten peace or act
aggressively). Article 41 allows the Security Council to call upon members to sever
diplomatic ties and completely interrupt economic relations and all means of communi-
cation with belligerent nations. Id. at art. 41. Article 42 gives the right of passage and
makes the territory of all member states available to the Security Council forces. Id. at
art. 42. Finally, article 45 provides that the Security Council may undertake to hold
national air force contingents immediately available for combined international action.
Id. at art. 45.
187. See N. ORVIK, supra note 183, at 252 (noting that the Security Council has
the right as well as the duty to determine when and by whom peace is threatened). If
such a determination is made, all member nations are then required to cooperate with
the Security Council in administering any form of sanctions against, or a severance of
diplomatic ties with the aggressor nation. Thus, the concept of neutrality is no longer
feasible. Id.
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trality as traditionally conceived may not be compatible with other
commitments, short of enforcement action, which states incur under
current international law through membership in international organi-
zations or in the community of nations in general. This incongruity, in
fact, has given rise to a concept of "differential neutrality"100 which
retains the element of non-participation in armed conflict but permits
political or economic support. The use of the term "neutrality," how-
ever, to describe this hybrid status is somewhat misleading since the
selective support it implies manifestly contradicts the reciprocal bal-
ance between the rights and obligations of belligerents and neutrals
which lies at the root of neutrality. Technically, therefore, a country
which makes such a distinction is acting outside the rules of neutrality
and exposing itself to the risk of countermeasures by the party discrim-
inated against.
Diverging opinion in this respect supports disposing of terms such as
"neutral" and "belligerent," which continue to carry connotations both
of law and fact existing in an earlier era as officials and scholars have
moved to substitute the more factually descriptive term "armed con-
flict" for "war." We might well also begin to use the terms "combat-
ant" and "noncombatant state" or "fighting" and "nonfighting state"
to reduce the risk of confusing description of conduct with legal out-
comes of decision regarding permissible acts of state."' 1
At the same time, appraising an evolving concept should not occur
merely through a change of terminology. Rather, acceptance of the
perception that each state has the responsibility to support interna-
tional public order may transform the existing notion that neutrality is
190. See D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 174-75 (1958) (not-
ing that increased use of the terms "qualified neutrality" or "nonbelligerency" indi-
cates a movement away from the traditional notion of neutrality); I. BROWNUE, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 402-04 (1963) (discussing that
absent an authoritative decision by a competent organ of the United Nations, states are
free to determine whether they will adopt a policy of absolute neutrality); M. GREENa-
SPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 530 (1959) (discussing the legal conse-
quences of being a nonbelligerent as opposed to neutral nation); L. OPPENHEal, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 648-49 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952) (noting that terms such as
"qualified neutrality" or "nonbelligerency" have come to replace the concept of neu-
trality); R. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 191-93 (1955) (dis-
cussing the decline of neutrality and the subsequent rise of nonbelligerency); Wilson,
Nonbelligerency in Relation to the Terminology of Neutrality, 35 AI. J. INT'L L. 121-
23 (1941) (illustrating that the term nonbelligerency does not refer to complete neu-
trality, but implies various shades of partiality).
191. See Williams, Neutrality in Modern Armed Conflicts: A Sun'ey of the Devel-
oping Law, 90 MIL. L. REv. 9, 13 (1980) (stating that a switch from such references
as "neutral" and "belligerent" to "noncombatant state" and "fighting," respectively,
reduces the risk of confusing descriptions of conduct with legal outcomes).
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an exercise of free choice. Community policy arguably demands the
widest necessary assumption of state responsibility in the world com-
munity to ensure that sufficient power is mobilized and employed to
overcome a belligerent that has resorted to the unlawful use of armed
force or has violated other fundamental principles of international law.
In this respect the characterization of a belligerent's conduct as un-
lawful should generate the widest participation in placing the required
resources at the disposal of those acting on behalf of the international
community to apply sanctions against an unlawful belligerent." Yet,
states ought to discriminate in favor of the belligerent acting for the
community, in a form varying from military activity to economic and
other non-military assistance. Similarly, states should actively defend
threatened values. 19 3 Such a policy results from the process of weighing
the risks involved in permitting intervention for the protection of basic
values against the risk of insulating genocidal acts and other funda-
mental abuses of human rights from effective response.
Some community policies favor intervention as a state's contribution
to the maintenance of global order. Other community policies, however,
emphasize minimum necessary consumption or destruction of human
and material resources. The latter emphasis would, in certain circum-
stances, promote neutrality to protect values at stake. Article 48 of the
United Nations Charter,19 4 as noted above, makes such allowance in
recognizing the possibility that various member states might remain
neutral in the event of United Nations action to maintain international
peace and security. Additional guidelines suggest that:
the nature of each state's participation in community action against an aggres-
sor, or in other community use of force, should vary, depending on that state's
capabilities; the requirements for assistance present in the particular situation
(e.g. base facilities, rights of transit, provision of supplies, or perhaps, merely
diplomatic support), and other factors.19'
192. See id. at 15-16 (noting that once the Security Council characterizes a bellig-
erent's conduct as unlawful, the principle of community responsibility is applicable and
member states are required to act together in applying sanctions against the unlawful
belligerent).
193. See Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 3, 14, 25 (J. Norton Moore ed. 1974)
[hereinafter J. Norton Moore, LAW AND CIVIL WAR] (noting that the United Nations
Charter recognizes unilateral force in defense of major values, but prohibits force used
for the purpose of imposing values on others).
194. See U.N. CHARTER art. 48 (stating that all members of the United Nations or
some of them may undertake actions required to carry out the Security Council's ef-
forts to impose sanctions against a belligerent nation).
195. See Williams, supra note 191, at 16-17 (suggesting that not all the members
of the United Nations need to participate in discrimination against an unlawful bellig-
erent in the absence of an all-encompassing global conflict).
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Another constraint is introduced by the notion that "humanitarian in-
tervention" is a matter to be dealt with at the initiative of international
bodies or regional organizations set up in accordance with the Charter's
provisions, rather than by individual nations.""0
Applying such standards a great majority of states could, as a matter
of practice, abstain from any form of involvement in international con-
flicts. Encouragement of neutrality could contribute to the maintenance
of world order, particularly through facilitating humanitarian efforts.
Neutral states provide the necessary infrastructural supports for the
implementation of humanitarian laws of armed conflict such as media-
tion, channels of communication between opposing belligerents, "Pro-
tecting Powers" under the Geneva Conventions, or locations for
negotiation.
197
In addition, the institution of neutrality performs a useful service in
maintaining a sphere of peace from which efforts to end war can arise.
Neutral states provide an objective, neutralizing influence against the
modern tendency toward ideological escalation of war and uncontrolled
build-up of national passions. Another function of neutrality is its phys-
ical containment of areas of potential conflict. Neutrality creates buffer
zones and secures peaceful areas which limit the destructive outcomes
of armed conflicts.
Notwithstanding the perceived value of neutrality in the mainte-
nance of international peace and security and the opportunities appar-
ently available for assuming a neutral posture amidst the world's con-
flicts, the question remains whether the present trend of decision-
making has moved beyond the existence of a duty not to assist an ag-
gressor state or the right not to assist any belligerent and has moved
toward the development of community expectations based upon com-
mon interest. This development is evident in the establishment of a
duty of "affirmative partiality," an obligation to provide an affirmative
assistance to belligerents combating unlawful disputes of world order.
196. See id. at 17-18 (noting that a permanently neutral state may serve a positive
function such as a "security buffer" between states that fear attack from one another).
The neutral state may help to improve relations between warring nations by serving as
a mediator, an impartial channel of communication, or by providing a location for ne-
gotiation. Id.
197. Id. at 26 (noting that the trend under the United Nations Charter is for the
Security Council to make a "recommendation" to states that they exercise passive dis-
crimination against an unlawful belligerent nation, allowing each state to use its own
discretion as to whether or not they will support the community effort); see also M.
McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LE-
GAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 430 (1961) (noting that the United
Nations encourages countries to exercise a policy of "permissive discrimination"
against belligerent nations).
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A brief survey of highly selected decisions suggests that the current
position is similar to that under the League of Nations. At most, a duty
of passive discrimination exists, that is, non-assistance to a state char-
acterized by the United Nations as an unlawful belligerent. 198 One
commentator suggests:
[a]bsent an ad hoc concurrence of interests of the permanent members of the
Security Council, sufficient to allow a controlling decision under article 39, which
in the foreseeable future will be a rare event, states will provide assistance on a
discriminatory basis to states engaged in armed conflict in support of interna-
tional peace and security. They will be free to be impartial towards all belliger-
ents, or to choose on the basis of individual characterization to discriminate
against the side viewed as an aggressor.199
Reference to states' behavior during the United Nations involvement in
Korea and in the course of the Arab-Israeli wars, supports the adoption
of "impartial neutrality." Nonetheless, a major dimension of states' in-
volvement in armed conflicts stems from politically motivated internal
violence, which bears significantly on general norms of international
law pertaining to international armed conflicts.
Particularly interesting in this respect is the effect of General Assem-
bly resolutions which, apart from prohibiting assistance to the incum-
bent administration, call for active support of insurgents. Some of these
resolutions invite all United Nations members "to provide material and
moral assistance to the national liberation movements in Colonial Ter-
ritories, '' 2° or "to offer moral, material and any other assistance to all
peoples struggling for the full exercise of their inalienable right to self-
determination and independence."' 201 Other relevant resolutions specify
that "peoples subject to colonial oppression are entitled to seek and re-
ceive all support in the struggle which is in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter. '202 Though neither legally binding,
nor universally supported politically, these series of resolutions on
decolonization may have contributed to a growing state practice of "af-
198. See Williams, supra note 191, at 19-27 (asserting that under most circum-
stances nations are free either to comply with Security Council recommendations or to
remain impartial toward all belligerents).
199. Id. at 26.
200. G.A. Res. 2105, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965); see also G.A. Res. 2908, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doe. A/
8730 (1972) (providing "maximum humanitarian and material assistance" to the peo-
ples in the territories under Portuguese admininstration).
201. G.A. Res. 3070, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78, U.N. Doe. A/9030
(1973).
202. G.A. Res. 2160, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 4, U.N. Doe. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8082
(1970).
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firmative partiality" and to a certain measure of acceptability of this
phenomenon in the international arena. 0 3
This current trend in the attitude of governments illustrates a gen-
eral reluctance on the part of states to rely on the customary law of
neutrality for ideological reasons. Because aggressive war is outlawed,
belligerent states have justified their conduct of armed hostilities by
recourse to other principles of international law thought more compel-
ling, that is, each has made its cause a bellum justum and its war a
just one.21 Such normative claims, which are often phrased in absolute
terms, do not readily admit strict impartiality and abstention for third
parties. Thus, although a legal duty on the latter to "take sides" cannot
be firmly grounded in positive international law, the institution of neu-
trality appears nonetheless to have undergone the corresponding trans-
formation expected in this era of "traditional just war revisited,"20 5
namely, toward the notion that every state should discriminate between
the just and unjust belligerent.
At the same time, in situations not involving United Nations enforce-
ment measures or in wars which do not directly concern international
values, however, some form of neutrality may prevail. Thus, for in-
stance, most countries206 chose to remain oblivious during the Falk-
lands War. The larger-scale conflict between Iran and Iraq is another
war in which most countries have remained neutral, although a recent
203. See Chatterje, Some Legal Problems of Support Role in International Law.
Tanzania and Uganda, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q. 755, 758-59 (1981) (citing several
examples of situations where a country lent support to another country involved in a
"liberation movement," in particular Tanzanian support for the Ugandan effort to
overthrow Idi Amin).
204. Norton, Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of
Neutrality, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249 (1976) (examining the law of neutrality since the
signing of the United Nations Charter, in particular how the clash between the ideol-
ogy and reality of the law of neutrality has contributed to its erosion).
205. Claude, Just Wars: Doctrines and Institutions, 95 PoL Sci. Q. 83, 94 (1980)
(employing the label "traditional just war revisited" in pointing out that since 1960,
the world has returned to the idea that it is permissible or even mandatory to fight to
promote justice and overturn evil).
206. Freedman, The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982, 61 FOREIGN An. 196,
200 (1982). But cf. 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 87, 88 (June 1982) (Statement of Secretary of
State George Schultz).
[1]n the light of Argentina's failure to accept a compromise, we must take con-
crete steps to underscore that the United States cannot and will not condone the
use of force to resolve disputes. The President has, therefore, ordered the suspen-
sion of all military exports to Argentina, the withholding of certification of Ar-
gentine eligibility for military sales and the suspension of new Export-Import
Bank credits and guarantees. The President has also directed that the United
States will respond positively to requests for material support for British forces.
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trend is showing states favoring Iraq.2 °7
Thus, the loose international system of today cannot sustain a highly
coherent body of international law governing the rights and obligations
of neutrals that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of how they
originate or regardless of who participates in them.2 °8 Indeed, to the
degree that the rules of neutrality have survived, specific practical in-
terpretations have refashioned such rules to fit the special demands of
modern warfare and the present world configuration.
2. States Acting Collectively in Self-Defense
A non-attacked state does not have any inherent right, established by
natural law, to assist an attacked state.20 9 The concept of "collective
self-defense" is nonetheless embodied in treaties and conventional law.
More importantly, collective self-defense is expressly recognized in arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter.21 0 The scope of application of
this institution is not, however, without controversy. What had
originated as a "linguistic problem"21' has turned into one which has
polarized opinions along ideological or political lines. Essentially, three
positions predominate in this matter:
A. That all states which purport to exercise the right of collective
self-defense must have a valid independent claim; no state may defend
another state unless each state could have legally exercised a right of
individual self-defense in the same circumstances. 12
B. That "collective self-defense" is basically the "defense of another
state" by states which come to the assistance of the victim of an armed
attack.213 That is, any group of states are free to treat an attack on one
207. Sterner, The Iran-Iraq War, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 128 (1984) (the author points
to the possible spillover effects of the war and the danger perceived by moderate Arab
states of the spread of the Iranian revolution as the reason for the quiet shift of several
countries to the Iraqi side).
208. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 224-25 (1961) (explaining that the law of neutrality applied to a period
when wars were limited to security objectives that did not affect the interests of other
states whereas today strong state interests often support non-neutral activities).
209. H. KELSEN, supra note 149, at 797.
210. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (protecting the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations),
211. H. KELSEN, supra note 149, at 792 (noting the term "collective self-defense"
is not quite correct because it involves action by states which are not attacked but only
assist the attacked state against its aggressor).
212. Bowett, Collective Self Defence Under the Charter of the United Nations, 32
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 150 (1955-56).
213, Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States, Collective Security, Law of War and
Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 769 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968)
(pointing out that most collective self-defense treaties stipulate, usually with a refer-
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as an attack on all.
C. That where an attack on one state threatens a substantial security
interest of another, the latter may come to the assistance of the
former.2 4
Proponents of the "attack-on-one-attack-on-all" formula tend to view
collective self-defense as an exercise of the residual obligation of mem-
bers under article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter, to act in the best way
possible to maintain peace and security. Given the Security Council's
inability to undertake decisive action, only arrangements for collective
self-defense can fulfill the first principle of the United Nations to take
effective collective measures to prevent threats to peace and to suppress
acts of aggression. 215 Such an interpretation of collective self-defense
comports with states' practice, particularly the multitude of bilateral
and multilateral treaties of alliance which explicitly refer to article
51.1 These treaties provide for aid by one party to another when the
latter has been attacked by a third state, irrespective of whether the
aggressor harbors any hostile intentions toward the former party as
well.
21 7
Opponents of the "attack-on-one-attack-on-all" theory argue that
this view openly invites states to intervene in any conflict between other
states anywhere in the world.21 s Because states invariably justify re-
ence to article 51, that a party will come to the defense of another if the latter is
attacked by a third party).
214. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 197, at 252.
215. BECKET, supra note 161, at 35 (citing the North Atlantic Treaty as an ex-
ample of a collective self-defense orgainzation which fulfills the "first principle of the
United Nations").
216. Skubiszewski, supra note 213, at 769; see also id. at 770 (listing the principal
collective alliances since 1945).
217. See North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243 (stating in part that "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties attacked by
taking forwith, individually and in concert with the other Party, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area."); see also Warsaw Pact, May 14, 1955, art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 3
(stating in part that "in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the
Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty,
in exercise of its right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall immediately, either indi-
vidually or in assistance of the state or states attacked, respond with all means as it
deems necessary, including armed force.").
218. Bowett, Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self Defense, in LAw
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, (J. Norton Moore ed. 1974) [hereinafter
Bowett] at 46 (citing Memorandum of the Department of State justifying United
States involvement in the Vietnam War as collective self-defense resulting from South
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course to force as self-defense, such a position encourages unilateral
assessment of the merits of competing claims, and may thus exacerbate
potential global conflict by reducing the incentives for recourse to col-
lective judgment within the structure of the United Nations.
Opponents of the "attack-on-one-attack-on-all" doctrine also assert
that it confuses collective self-defense with collective security-two dis-
tinct institutions. 19 What distinguishes collective self-defense from se-
curity is that the former, the right to intervene, stems from the threat
to the state's own security. Absent such a threat, the state shares the
general interest of state members of the collective security system to
maintain international peace. This must, however, take the form of par-
ticipation in collective security action authorized by the competent or-
gans and not constitute unilateral action.2
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that defensive alliances,
which must fulfill the requirements of article 51,221 exist and function
not within but parallel to the United Nations system. Defensive alli-
ances generally yield to United Nations intervention only when the
United Nations is in a postion to take measures which replace the ac-
tion commenced in collective self-defense. These extraneous defensive
alliances are thus arguably distinguishable from collective security
measures, as well as from regional arrangements concluded under arti-
cle 52.222
The above line of reasoning fails to consider whether a treaty can
constitute a right of collective self-defense. A treaty cannot create or
confer a greater right, but only recognize a pre-existing right and make
provision for its effective implementation. Accordingly, the existing
right must find its basis in a threat to the security of the intervening
state. Thus, if state A attacks state B, the latter has a right of self-
Vietnam's right to self-defense); see also Memorandum of the Department of State on
the Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 5 I.L.M. 565
(1965).
219. J. STONE, supra note 149, at 264. "As distant from each other as order is
from chaos, as modern England from the England of Wars of the Roses, as a society
from a leaderless robber band struggling amongst themselves for dominance, as the
administration of justice from a duel; in short as ordered living from the anarchic
struggle to survive." Id.
220. Bowett, supra note 218, at 47.
221. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (requiring that "measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council . . .to take such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security").
222. Id. at art. 52 (stating that regional arrangements are not subject to being
superseded by United Nations action unless the Members of the regional arrangement
refer the dispute to the Security Council).
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defense. If in all the circumstances that attack also creates a threat to
the security of another state, that other state has an independent right
of self-defense which it may exercise in concert, or collectively, with
state B.228
This basis, as indicated earlier, does not find support in the practice
of states, in either the international or domestic 2 ' spheres. Addition-
ally, either the exercise of collective self-defense under a defense pact
lies within article 51 of the Charter. Indeed, if the term "[or] collec-
tive" is to have any independent meaning at all, it should be inter-
preted in the light of state practice and the prevalent doctrine. These
entail both the right of the attacked state to seek help pursuant to the
treaty and the right, in fact obligation, of a party to that treaty, which
does not have the individual right of self-defense, to assist the attacked
state.
This is not to suggest that the notion of collective self-defense is a
liberal one. Since such a right is an exception to the prohibition of arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter, the treaty under which it arises should be given
a restrictive interpretation. The right of the assisting state is essentially
"derivative or secondary," thus its exercise is "wholly dependent on,
and in its scope identical to, the individual right of the attacked
state. '225 In particular, aid must lie within the limits of the defense of a
third state, and the joint action should be consonant with the require-
ment of proportionality. The assisting state must not pursue any politi-
cal goals of its own, or engage in any measures that are not indispensa-
ble for the effective military effort. That is, the assistance must be
* given under conditions that satisfy article 51, including the stipulation
of immediate reporting to the Security Council. Given these restric-
223. Bowett, supra note 218, at 48.
224. See, e.g., MODERN PENAL CODE § 3.04, 3.05 (1962) (justifying the use of
force in the reasonable protection of oneself or of others). In Commonwealth v. Martin,
341 N.E.2d. 885 (Mass. 1976), the court held that "an actor is justified in using force
when (a) a reasonable person in the actor's position would believe his intervention to be
necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as that
reasonable person would believe them to be, the third person would be justified in using
such force to protect himself." Id. In an English case, Regina v. Duffy, 1 Q.B. 63, 67
(Crim. App. 1967), the court recognized the right to intervene in a fight for the pur-
pose of rescuing a person being attacked, even if the persons involved are strangers. Id.
French law similarly authorizes "legitimate defense" of oneself or another. C. PtN. art.
328.
225. Rohlik, Some Remarks on Self-Defense and Intervention: A Reaction to
Reading "Law and Civil War in the Modern World," 6 GA. J. INT'L & Cotip. L. 395,
426 (1976).
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tions, the fears of "wholesale intervention"22 and "expansion of con-
flict" 227 become largely unwarranted.
Finally, relying on collective self-defense treaties seems pragmatic in
a world in which the collective security system under the Charter has
proved grossly inadequate.228 The "paralysis" of the Security Council
in wake of the Permanent Members' "veto" power has made it neces-
sary to fall back on looser cooperative forms of collective peace en-
forcement that depend ultimately for their efficacy on the initiative and
effort of individual member states. Admittedly, misuse of alliances, in
the form of intervention by a dominant member in the internal affairs
of other members under the pretext of the threat of an attack by an
outside power, is a common phenomenon. 2 Yet, collective self-defense
treaties do offer some guarantee to small nations and thus contribute to
a better balance of power, enhancing in the process the overall stability
of the international system. This said, there still is considerable scope
for the introduction of effective safeguards, for instance, shorter dura-
tion of treaties and their frequent review2 31 to minimize abusive in-
terventionary policies.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Historically, the principle of "legitimate authority" developed in re-
sponse to the proliferation of private warfare and the adverse conse-
quences of overly decentralized political practices. At present, this
problem is no cause for concern, but with the emergence of the factor
of national liberation movements, it may be said to exist in a different
form. As a result, considerable attention has been accorded to the issue
of whether and under what circumstances do non-state entities qualify
as the "legitimate authority" for the purpose of the just war criteria.
226. Bowett, supra note 218, at 49 (expressing the fear that a too liberal interpre-
tation of the concept of self-defense would allow wholesale intervention and threaten
the rule of non-intervention and the collective security system). A restrictive view of
self-defense is therefore essential.
227. Farer, Law and War, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 15,
67 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971) (explaining that since states almost always justify
resort to force as self-defense, collective self-defense measures often endorse unilateral
perceptions of competing claims, which in turn lead to an expansion of the conflict).
228. A. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 192-93 (1979).
229. Rohlik, supra note 225, at 424 (describing situations where major powers as-
semble various smaller states under their spheres of interest and link them to them-
selves under the treaty system).
230. Id. at 430 (contending that in order for the United States to make its interna-
tional commitment credible, it should in the future seek bilateral self-defense treaties
concluded for a span of three to five years, at the end of which Congress would review
the treaty rather then automatically renew it).
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WHO MAY WAGE WAR
This issue is highly controversial and has spawned a great variety of
views, underpinned by intense ideologies and strong interests.
Another question that looms large in the contemporary discussion of
the "who" criterion is the legitimacy and competence of a particular
officer or organ of state to initiate war. Given the development of dem-
ocratic institutions and the fact that state powers are not as absolute as
they used to be, observers ponder to what extent rulers are free to exer-
cise war-making powers on behalf of the ruled, and how to ensure ac-
countability on the part of the former to the latter. Still, no clear legal
guidelines have emerged in this respect, despite lip-service paid to lofty
constitutional principles.
Consideration has also been given to the authority of other decision-
making bodies, namely regional and international organizations. Both
types of organizations, which have proliferated in the twentieth century
in the wake of the growing interdependence of states, have featured
prominently in international conflicts, and the various claims made
with respect to their powers to use force warrant examination.
Also worthy of examination is the issue of neutrality. Notwithstand-
ing its theoretical importance, the principle of neutrality is no longer as
viable as it was previously. Neutral status, however, still imposes limits
on war-making powers, and its ramifications continue to merit discus-
sion in the context of the question "who may wage war?"
Another phenomenon that impinges on the same question is that of
collective self-defense. Again, this is a domain characterized by consid-
erable ambiguity, and the war powers exercised under this category
defy clear delineation.
In sum, although important guidelines as to who may wage war have
evolved over the years, no unequivocal means are available for imple-
menting them in practice. The criterion of the "legitimate authority"
itself may nonetheless serve to identify relevant issues and provide a
general tool for evaluating a given use of force with a view to possibly
circumscribing it.
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